Slot Regulation at High Density Airports: How Did We Get Here and Where Are We Going by Gleimer, Eileen M.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 61 | Issue 4 Article 4
1996
Slot Regulation at High Density Airports: How Did
We Get Here and Where Are We Going
Eileen M. Gleimer
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eileen M. Gleimer, Slot Regulation at High Density Airports: How Did We Get Here and Where Are We Going, 61 J. Air L. & Com. 877
(1996)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol61/iss4/4
SLOT REGULATION AT HIGH DENSITY AIRPORTS: HOW
DID WE GET HERE AND WHERE ARE WE GOING?
EILEEN M. GLEIMER*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 877
II. THE HISTORY OF THE HIGH DENSITY RULE
AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE
BUY-SELL RULE ................................... 878
A. THE HISTORY OF THE HIGH DENSITY RULE ....... 878
B. THE ALLOCATION OF SLOTS ...................... 880
C. THE BUY-SELL RULE ............................. 887
III. THE CURRENT HIGH DENSITY
RESTRICTIONS .................................... 892
IV. THE SLOT MARKET CREATED BY THE BUY-
SELL RULE ....... ..................... ........... 896
A. THE SALE AND LEASE OF SLOTS .................. 896
B. THE VALUE OF SLOTS ............................ 899
C. THE USE OF SLOTS AS COLLATERAL .............. 902
V. THE EFFECT OF THE BUY-SELL RULE ON
COMPETITION .................................... 907
VI. EFFORTS TO EXPAND OPERATIONS AT HIGH
DENSITY AIRPORTS ............................... 911
A. CALLS FOR REFORM ............................... 911
B. INCREASING ACCESS AT HIGH DENSITY AIRPORTS . 914
C. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? ................ 922
VII. CONCLUSION ............................. ....... 929
I. INTRODUCTION
AS WITH ANYTHING in the area of airline regulation, recon-
iling the government's actions- with its stated intent and the
practicalities of the industry is frequently quite difficult. The
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regulations often do not address the issues of concern, or the
history or language of the regulations themselves seems to belie
the facts as they appear to the observer. The history of slots at
high density airports is an example of aviation regulation that
has developed a life of its own, and as a result, appears to have
ensured its longevity-if not its immortality.
This Article will address the history and development of slots
and the high density rule in an attempt to shed greater light on
the evolution of the buy-sell rule, and the value and use of slots
which developed as a consequence of their marketability. It will
also address practical concerns relating to the protection and
preservation of the value of slots, including the inability to pre-
dict with any certainty what the government may do and what
will happen to the operations of airlines using the slots. Finally,
it will address recent efforts to increase capacity at high density
airports and the future of slot restrictions at high density
airports.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE HIGH DENSITY RULE AND
THE EVOLUTION OF THE BUY-SELL RULE
A. THE HISTORY OF THE HIGH DENSITY RULE
In 1968 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in an ef-
fort to alleviate congestion, proposed special air traffic rules that
would apply to certain airports which it designated as high den-
sity airports.' The FAA's initial focus was on the Chicago, New
York, and Washington areas-specifically John F. Kennedy In-
ternational Airport (JFK), LaGuardia Airport (LGA), Newark In-
ternational Airport (EWR), Chicago O'Hare International
Airport (ORD), and Washington National Airport (DCA) 2 The
33 Fed. Reg. 12,580 (1968) (codified as amended at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93, subpt.
K) (proposed Sept. 5, 1.968). The notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) was
issued following a period of substantial flight delays and airport congestion and
an increasing concern that the airport and airway system were on the verge of
saturation, especially in Chicago, New York, and Washington. See AIR TRANsP.
ASS'N OF AM., TI4E AIRLINE SCHEDULING COMMITTEE 1 (1992) [hereinafter THE
AIRLINE SCHEDULING COMMITEE].
2 33 Fed. Reg. 12,580, 12,581. At the time the high density rule was proposed,
operating restrictions already existed at DCA. These restrictions began in 1966
when the DCA carriers, at the request of the FAA, entered into a voluntary agiee-
ment to limit their operations to 40 per hour. This agreement was made in lieu
of the government imposing restrictions to ameliorate the congestion that re-
sulted shortly after the jet aircraft ban was lifted at DCA. See Notice of Study and
Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 15,332 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 FAA Re-
quest for Comments]; Comments of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Au-
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FAA indicated, however, that if congestion and delay increased
in other areas, it would consider extending these air traffic
rules.' These rules proposed to limit the number of Instrument
Flight Rule (IFR)4 operations (takeoff and landings) permitted
per hour and to require that each operation be supported by a
"slot."5 The FAA proposed to allocate the hourly IFR reserva-
tions or "slots" among three classes of users-scheduled air car-
riers (except air taxis), scheduled air taxis, and all other aircraft
operators.6 These classifications were originally described pri-
marily by reference to the carriers' economic authority,7 an area
which at the time was within the primary jurisdiction of the
CAB, rather than the FAA.
thority (MWAA), FAA Docket 27,644, at 4-5 (May 27, 1994) (on file with SMU
Law Review Association). In 1967, a proceeding was instituted by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (CAB) to determine whether the congestion problem could be
resolved by requiring airlines to use Washington Dulles International Airport in
lieu of DCA.' This proceeding was terminated without final action based, in part,
on the existence of the voluntary agreement among the airlines and the issuance
of the high density rule which was believed to reduce the congestion at DCA. Id.
at 5-6.
3 33 Fed. Reg. 12,580, 12,581.
4 The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) require IFR operations when
weather conditions are below the minimum for flight under visual flight rules
(VFR). 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1995).
5 33 Fed. Reg. 12,580, 12,581. In fixing the number of IFR operations, the
FAA advised that it would consider airport ground facilities, weather conditions,
noise abatement procedures, aircraft mix, uniformity of flow, runway combina-
tions, and the availability of alternative airports.
6 Id.
7 These classes have evolved over time to the present classes of slots, namely,
air carrier slots, commuter slots, and others. The air carrier and commuter slot
categories focus on the size of the aircraft being operated. The remaining cate-
gory serves as a catch-all covering general aviation with aircraft of any size and
certain charter flights.
8 Title IV of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, granted the CAB
jurisdiction over the licensing of U.S. and foreign air carriers engaging in air
transportation and related economic matters. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1389 (1988).
Following the sunset of the CAB on December 31, 1984, economic licensing and
other functions administered by the CAB that did not expire under the Civil
Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 (1984)
[hereinafter Sunset Act] were transferred to the Department of Transportation
(DOT). See 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1988). On July 5, 1994, Congress repealed the
Federal Aviation Act as part of the codification of certain U.S. Transportation
Laws as title 49 of the United States Code. Act of July 5,,1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994).
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In December 1968 the FAA adopted the high density rule.9
In the preamble to the rule, the FAA advised that the rule
should not be viewed as the permanent solution to the air con-
gestion problem and that it would be kept under continuing re-
view and modified as circumstances required or permitted.1" In
February 1969 the FAA amended the rule, specifically stating
that it would be temporary in nature and establishing December
31, 1969, as the expiration date.11 By that date the FAA hoped
that the problem of congestion would be alleviated; if not, fur-
ther rulemaking action would be considered. 12
Despite the FAA's statement that the limitations contained in
the high density rule "are not the permanent solution to the air
congestion problem, 1 3 the FAA continued to extend the high
density rule based on its perception that the conditions which
led to its promulgation continued to exist.1 4 The rule was never
extended to other airports, and in 1970 the rule was suspended
at EWR. 5 In 1973, the FAA finally admitted that it was retaining
the high density rule at ORD, JFK, LGA, and DCA indefinitely.16
In short, the FAA appeared to believe that extensive federal reg-
ulation of operations at these airports was the only way to allevi-
ate congestion.
B. THE ALLOCATION OF SLOTS
Although the high density rule allocated the number of slots
among the different types of operators, it did not contain a pro-
9 33 Fed. Reg. 17,896 (1968) (FAA final rule designating JFK, LGA, EWR,
ORD, and DCA as high density airports). The rule was to become effective on
April 27, 1969, in order to coincide with the seasonal schedule changes. Id. at
17,898.
10 Id. Although many comments submitted in response to the proposed rule
called for the rule to be temporary with a fixed expiration date, the FAA chose
not to set a specific expiration date, choosing instead to have a more fluid ongo-
ing review of the continued need for the rule. Id.
11 34 Fed. Reg. 2603, 2603 (1969). At the same time, the FAA postponed the
effective date of high density rule from April 27, 1969, until June 1, 1969, to
provide additional time for the adjustment of operations by all users of the air-
ports and excluded from the high density rule extra sections of flights conducted
at EWR, LGA, and ORD. Id. Extra sections were already permitted at DCA. See
THE AIRLINE SCHEDULING COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 13; see also 14 C.F.R.
§ 93.123(b) (4) (1995).
12 See 34 Fed. Reg. 2603, 2603.
13 Id.
14 See 35 Fed. Reg. 16,591, 16,592 (1970); 37 Fed. Reg. 22,793, 22,793 (1972).
15 35 Fed. Reg. 16,591, 16,592 (the high density rule is suspended at EWR
based on a determination that demand at the airport remains below capacity).
16 38 Fed. Reg. 29,463 (1973).
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vision allocating the slots among the operators within each class.
In fact, the FAA expressly contemplated that the airlines would
voluntarily arrive at decisions to reduce their schedules to the
level required by the high density rule and noted that the air-
lines were already discussing schedule changes pursuant to au-
thority granted by the CAB.17
The Scheduling Committee Agreements, which were devel-
oped by the airlines to govern the allocation practice, were sub-
mitted to the CAB for approval under section 412 of the Federal
Aviation Act.18 The CAB approved the agreements, thereby 9
17 See 33 Fed. Reg. 17,896, 17,897. In an effort to forestall government action,
in 1968 Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) petitioned the CAB pursuant to § 412
of the Federal Aviation Act to permit the airlines to discuss the implementation
of voluntary schedule changes at Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Washing-
ton. THE AIRLINE SCHEDULING COMMITrEE, supra note 1, at 1-2. The CAB granted
the airlines the authority to hold such discussions for a period of sixty days sub-
ject to certain conditions, including the requirement that all airlines serving the
four cities be allowed to participate. Id. at 2 (citing C.A.B. Order Nos. 68-7-138
and 68-8-30). In the course of these discussions, it became apparent that the
resolution of the problem of congestion would be extremely difficult and that
reducing the number of operations and shifting the times of others would be
required. Id. at 5. Although the airlines had not been able to agree on the re-
ductions, they made every effort to agree on procedures that they hoped would
prevent government-imposed capacity limits. The airlines also limited the focus
to the airports serving Chicago, Washington, and New York. Id. at 7-9. The air-
lines further agreed to draft separate agreements for each of the cities and to
hold separate meetings for each airport. The Chicago and New York agreements
would become effective when signed by the airlines representing 90% of the op-
erations in each city, and the DCA agreement would be effective when signed by
all carriers operating at the airport. Id. at 10 n.11.
I See 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1988) (repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 41309) (West 1995). Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act required the filing
of all agreements affecting air transportation with the CAB. Following the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, this section became permissive. The Sunset Act fur-
ther modified § 412 of the Federal Aviation Act to provide that § 412 would cease
to be in effect with respect to interstate and overseas air transportation on Janu-
ary 1, 1989. Sunset Act, supra note 8, § 3(c) (6), 98 Stat. at 1704.
19 Agreements filed pursuant to § 412(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
as amended, for the establishment of airline scheduling committees, Order Ap-
proving Agreement, C.A.B. Order No. 68-12-11 (Dec. 3, 1968) (approving the
Airline Scheduling Committee Agreements); Agreements filed pursuant to
§ 412(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, for discussions among
certain air taxis and the establishment of scheduling committees, Order Approv-
ing Agreement, C.A.B. Order No. 69-2-52 (Feb. 12, 1969) (approving the agree-
ments to form scheduling committees for scheduled air taxi operators). The
CAB first sought public comment on the agreement submitted on behalf of nu-
merous airlines proposing to establish scheduling committees "to arrange for the
administration of a program for the adjustment of scheduled domestic and for-
eign air transportation" at JFK, LGA, EWR, DCA, and ORD. Agreements filed
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granting the carriers immunity from the antitrust laws °.2  This
approval and antitrust immunity enabled the airlines to allocate
the slots among the carriers operating, or wishing to operate, at
the particular high density airport and imposed certain condi-
tions. Perhaps most significant were the requirements that ad-
justments in schedules be voluntary and that the limitations on
operations not be greater than those imposed by the FAA's
regulations.21
Because of the requirement that schedule changes be volun-
tary, the schedule changes could not be made unless there was
unanimity among the affected carriers.2 2 Not surprisingly, una-
•nimity was difficult to achieve and at times impossible, particu-
larly after deregulation. 23 In fact, in 1980 the FAA intervened
when the DCA Air Carrier Scheduling Committee was dead-
locked because of New York Air's request for a significant
pursuant to § 412(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended for the
establishment of airline scheduling committees, Order Approving Agreement,
C.A.B. Order No. 68-10-45 (Oct. 10, 1968). In approving the agreements, the
CAB acknowledged the need for these agreements in order to implement the
high density rule and granted the carriers antitrust immunity.. As the CAB noted,
although the FAA established the maximum number of movements at each of
the high density airports and apportioned the number of movements among the
classes of carriers, the FAA did not make allocations to each member of each
class, anticipating that such an allocation would be accomplished by voluntary
agreements among the class members. C.A.B. Order No. 68-12-11, at 4. Notwith-
standing the grant of antitrust immunity, the CAB recognized the need to limit
the discussions to those necessary to meet the limitations imposed by the high
density rule in an attempt to ensure that no anticompetitive behavior would re-
sult. As such, the CAB conditioned its approval of the agreements (1) to require
that any adjustments-or reductions in operations be made for the sole purpose of
complying with the FAA's requirements; (2) to prohibit the discussion of city pair
markets or other competitive factors; (3) to require notice of meetings and at-
tendance of CAB and other designated representatives; and (4) to require the
filing of proposed schedules submitted by the carriers and complete reports of
the meetings. Id. at 5-6.
20 At the time, the approval under § 412 of the Federal Aviation Act carried
with it automatic immunity from the antitrust laws under § 414. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 1384 (1988).
21 See C.A.B. Order No. 68-12-11 at 7; see also THE AIRLINE SCHEDULING COMMIT-
TEE, supra note 1, at 11.
22 See id. at app. H.
23 The other practical shortcoming of the airline scheduling committees was
the absence of a use-or-lose rule which would have freed up so called "pocket
slots" which carriers held but did not need to support their operations. The re-
tention of "pocket slots" stemmed from the fact that each slot held by an airline
reduced the number of slots held by its competitors. As the prospects of a buy-
sell rule increased, the pocket slot problem became more prevalent. See id. at 42-
43.
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number of slots to mount a competitive Washington-New York
shuttle service.24 The FAA's intervention gave New York Air the
ability to launch its operation, although the allocation by the
FAA fell short of New York Air's request-an uncompromising
request which triggered the impasse. 5
The FAA's experience in the allocation of air traffic control
resources following the 1980 DCA impasse was put to the test in
1981 following the air traffic controllers' strike. Because of the:
significant constraints on the control system created by the
strike, the FAA implemented restrictions at twenty-two of the
country's busiest airports based on a modified lottery and per-
centage reduction of the scheduled flights published by carri-
ers.26 These restrictions superseded and in many cases were
24 See 45 Fed. Reg. 69,403 (1980) (request for comments on the mechanism to
be used for allocation of slots at DCA in face of deadlock of the scheduling com-
mittee); Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 43, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,637
(1980).
25 The FAA allocated to New York Air 18 of the 20 slots it requested by taking
slots which the incumbent carriers proposed to relinquish in the course of an
incomplete nonbinding exercise and by taking an additional slot from each of
the twelve largest carriers in the conimittee. See 45 Fed. Reg. 72,637, 72,640. This
action by the FAA was perceived as having a chilling effect on the willingness of
the scheduling committee participants to engage in nonbinding exercises, and,
as such, an adverse impact on the continued viability.of the scheduling commit-
tee process. See THE AIRLINE SCHEDULING COMMrITEE, supra note 1, at 31-33, 49;
see also DEP'T OF TRANSP. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: A STUDY OF THE HIGH DEN-
sn-v RULE 25 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS]. Although
the FAA's action was challenged, it was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit which determined that the action of the Secretary of Transpor-
tation was within the agency's statutory authority, procedurally adequate, and ra-
tionally based. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1318 (8th
Cir. 1981). The court further determined that the action was consistent with the
procompetitive policies of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Id.
26 See THE AIRLINE SCHEDULING COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 35, 40-41. Because
the high density rule permitted carriers to operate VFR flights at high density
airports without regard to the quotas, many airlines had far more flights listed in
the Official Airline Guide (OAG) than slots to support them. Although this meant
that the carriers had to cancel or reroute flights when IFR conditions prevailed,
they were in a far better position under the Interim Operations Plan (IOP) since
their permitted operations were based on the number of flights published in the
OAG, not the number of slots they held. Id. at 35. Not long after the air traffic
controllers' strike began, the FAA amended the high density rule to require IFR
reservations, and therefore slots, for operations at DCA. See 46 Fed. Reg. 58,036,
58,041 (1981). To prevent the situation which became apparent during the IOP
wherein the scheduled flights of some carriers far exceeded the number of slots
held by the carrier at the airport, the FAA changed the rule to preclude any
operation that is regularly scheduled to or from a high density airport from being
operated under VFR to the extent such operation exceeds the high density limi-
tations. 14 C.F.R. § 93.129(c) (1995).
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more stringent than those imposed by the high density rule. 27
Due to the substantial constraints on operations under the 1OP,
and perhaps because the FAA had gained experience from the
carriers' tendency to hold "pocket slots," the FAA imposed a use-
or-lose requirement in an attempt to maximize the utilization of
airspace.2 s
In an effort to ameliorate some of the scheduling difficulties
created by the reductions imposed by the 1OP, the CAB ap-
proved a Slot Exchange Agreement.29 Notwithstanding the at-
tempt to maximize utilization through the use-or-lose rule and
to increase flexibility with the Slot Exchange Agreement, the
carriers continued to experience significant scheduling difficul-
ties. As a result, the FAA in 1982 implemented an experimental
buy-sell program which lasted approximately six weeks.30 Dur-
ing the six-week period, over 300 slots were transferred, of which
27 These restrictions, which lasted approximately three years and superseded
the high density rule, were set forth in SFAR No. 44, 46 Fed. Reg. 39,606 (1981).
As the immediacy of the emergency abated, the FAA issued more detailed regula-
tions in modifications to SFAR No. 44 (Interim Operations Plan or IOP). See
SFAR No. 44-1, 46 Fed. Reg. 44,424 (1981); SFAR No. 44-1, 46 Fed. Reg. 44,740
(1981); SFAR No. 44-2, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,906 (1981); SFAR No. 44-3, 47 Fed. Reg.
7816 (1982); SFAR No. 44-3, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,989, 19,989 (1982) (notice of FAA
policy permitting the transfer of arrival slots in any number and for any type of
consideration at the 22 impacted airports); SFAR No. 44-3, 47 Fed. Reg. 25,508,
25,508 (1982) (extension of policy permitting transfers); SFAR No. 44-3, 47 Fed.
Reg. 29,814, 29,814 (1982) (suspension of transfer policy); SFAR No. 44-5, 47
Fed. Reg. 35,156, 35,161 (1982); SFAR No. 44-5, 47 Fed. Reg. 43,278, 43,280
(1982); SFAR No. 44-6, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,324, 56326 (1982).
28 SFAR No. 44-3, 47 Fed. Reg. 7816, 7819 (1982) (slots must be used a mini-
mum of 70% of their scheduled use or are subject to forfeiture).
29 The CAB's approval of the Slot Exchange Agreement imposed several condi-
tions, including a requirement that the procedure for slot exchanges be designed
to ensure anonymity. SeeATA, Slot-Allocation discussions, 92 C.A.B. 1301 (1981)
(Order No. 81-11-102). To fulfill this condition, the carriers wishing to acquire
or trade slots would advise the chairman of the scheduling committee in writing.
The requests would then be reviewed and matched to the extent possible. See
THE AIRLINE SCHEDULING COMMI=-EE, supra note 1, at 41.
30 SFAR No. 44-3, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,989, 19,989 (notice of FAA policy permit-
ting.the transfer of arrival slots in any number and for any type of consideration
at the 22 impacted airports); SFAR No. 44-3, 47 Fed. Reg. 25,508, 25,508 (exten-
sion of policy permitting transfers); SFAR No. 44-3, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,814, 29,814
(suspension of transfer policy). What a carrier could sell was defined by its pre-
strike operating base which included the flights at high density airports that were
listed in the OAG even if there were no slots to support them. This resulted in a
substantial benefit to many carriers. See THE AIRLINE SCHEDULING COMMITTEE,
supra note 1, at 35. The eventual elimination of controls at the vast majority of
the affected airports also meant that carriers may have purchased operating
rights which they no longer needed.
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over 190 were sold.31 This experimental program was the first
official experience that the government and the carriers had
with a buy-sell program and shed light on the value placed on
slots and some of the attendant risks associated with the treat-
ment of slots as property. However, because only carriers were
permitted to own slots and because of the short term nature of
this program, many of the issues which now arise in slot transac-
tions were not relevant and perhaps not apparent at that time.
As the air traffic control situation returned to normal, the
FAA in 1983 issued a proposal to rescind the high density rule at
ORD, JFK, EWR, and LGA.12 Because DCA was subject to sepa-
rate treatment and included a passenger cap,33 it was not in-
cluded in the proposal to rescind the rule. The proposal,
however, was never adopted. By August 1984 all IOP limitations
were lifted and capacity restrictions were once again governed
by the high density rule. 4
Shortly after all IOP restrictions were lifted, it once again be-
came apparent that congestion and delays at major airports dur-
ing peak hours were a significant problem. In response, Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. (Eastern) petitioned the CAB for discussion au-
thority and approval under sections 412 and 414 of the Federal
Aviation Act to enable carriers to integrate their schedules.
Although the CAB believed that the discussions could reduce
31 SFAR No. 44-3, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,814, 29,815; see also Government Policies on the
Transfer of Operating Rights Granted by the Federal Government, Particularly Certificates
of Public Convenience and Necessity and Airport Slots: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
73 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Aviation Subcommittee Hearings] (testimony of Robert
E. Cohn, General Counsel, People Express).
32 48 Fed. Reg. 13,434, 13,434 (1983) (proposed Mar. 31, 1983). The FAA
proposed to remove the limitations on operations atJFK, LGA, and ORD and to
delete EWR from the rule since the limitations imposed by the rule had been
suspended at EWR for many years.
33 In an effort to address the growing controversy regarding the magnitude of
operations at DCA, regulations were issued in 1980 that would reduce the
number of air carrier operations at DCA from 40 to 36 per hour and limit the
number of passengers served at DCA to 17 million per year. 1994 FAA Request
for Comments, supra note 2, at 9. Before the regulations became effective, how-
ever, litigation was instituted challenging, among other things, the reduction to
36 operations per hour. Id. at 10. In late 1981 new regulations were issued re-
ducing the number of air carrier operations per hour to 37 instead of 36 and
adopting a 16 million annubd passenger limitation along with a regulatory proce-
dure to reduce the number of slots in order to maintain the passenger cap. Id. at
11; see also 46 Fed. Reg. 58,036, 58,037.
34 See 49 Fed. Reg. 8237, 8244 (1984).
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competition,35 it granted the authority and antitrust immunity
necessary for airlines to participate in such discussions based on
its belief that there was a potential for securing important public
benefits-namely, a reduction in travel delays-and because it
could find no materially less anticompetitive method of tackling
the problem.36
In spite of all of these efforts, dissatisfaction with the slot allo-
cation system was growing. In particular, it was becoming appar-
ent that the scheduling committees and the other "voluntary"
arrangements simply were not working in the era of deregula-
tion. The requirement for unanimity and the absence of dead-
lock breaking mechanisms or use-or-lose rule made new entry
and growth difficult. For example, New York Air was only able
to commence a competitive shuttle service in the Northeast be-
cause the FAA allocated a sufficient number of slots upon being
advised by the scheduling committee that it was deadlocked. 7
The practical impediments to the functioning of the scheduling
committees, combined with the fundamental tenet of deregula-
tion that market-based mechanisms were a better and more pro-
competitive form of allocation, led to increased discussions in
industry, Congress, and the FAA regarding the possibility of a
buy-sell rule. 38 Initially, the prospect of a buy-sell rule and the
35 See Application for Discussion Authority and Prior Board Approval of Car-
rier Agreement to Integrate Schedules, Order Granting Discussion Authority,
C.A.B. Order No. 84-8-129, at 9-10 (Aug. 31, 1984) (1984 Discussion Authority).
The CAB noted that the discussions go to the "heart" of the competitive pro-
cess-namely, scheduling. Id. at 9. Because this would affect output, such agree-
ments among competitors are per se violations of the antitrust laws. Jd. at 10.
Because of the important public benefits, however, the CAB approved the agree-
ment and granted antitrust immunity subject to numerous conditions, including
a requirement that any changes made be made on a voluntary basis. Id. at 13.
36 Id. at 9-10, 13-14; see also Application for Discussion Authority and Prior Ap-
proval of Carrier Agreements to Integrate Schedules, Order (Schedule Integra-
tion Order), C.A.B. Order No. 84-10-120, (Oct. 25, 1984); THE AIRLINE
SCHEDULING COMMrrEE, supra note 1, at 36-37.
37 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
38 See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 72,637, 72,638 (1980) (FAA noted suggestions that
slots be treated as marketable rights); 49 Fed. Reg. 23,788, 23,790 (1984) (pro-
posedJune 7, 1984) (NPRM soliciting comments on allowing air carriers to trans-
fer slots for any consideration with minimal government regulation and citing to
comments filed in 1983 by the Air Transport Association proposing that carriers
be permitted to buy and sell slots); 1984 Discussion Authority, supra note 35, at 5-
7 (the CAB noted that Federal Trade Commission (FTC) staff and the Council-of
Economic Advisors prefer a market-based method of distributing slots to adminis-
trative approaches); 1985 Aviation Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 31, at 71
(hearings called to address the methods of allocating and transferring operating
rights in a deregulated environment).
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absence of a deadlock breaking mechanism increased the
number of pocket slots since they did not want to give away what
could ultimately become a valuable asset.
In June 1984 the FAA requested public comment on alterna-
tive methods of slot allocation.39 Many of the alternatives dis-
cussed in the proposed rule reflected the experience gained by
the FAA during the air traffic controllers' strike-namely, the
use of lotteries to allocate slots and the transfer of slots through
a buy-sell mechanism.40
C. THE BUY-SELL RULE
In December 1985 the FAA adopted the buy-sell rule, permit-
ting air carrier and commuter slots to be transferred for any
consideration. 41 This rule, unlike the experimental program in
1982, permitted non-air carriers to hold slots42 -something
which is significant for carriers wishing to use their slots as secur-
ity as well as communities that may wish to ensure the preserva-
tion of service to a high density airport. The rule provided that
beginning April 1, 1986, permanent slots (except those desig-
nated for international or essential air service (EAS) ) 43 could be
purchased, sold, traded, or leased by any party, in any number,
at any high density airport on a daily, weekly, monthly, or any
other basis.44 To avoid disruption to air service, the initial allo-
cation of slots was made to air carriers and commuters who held
permanent slots45 on December 16, 1985, the effective date of
39 49 Fed. Reg. 23,788, 23,788.
4 Id. at 23,789-90.
41 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,180 (1985) (codified as amended at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93,
subpt. S).
42 Id. at 52,182. The holder of the slot is effectively its "owner" while the opera-
tor is the user.
43 EAS is a program that was developed by Congress in conjunction with airline
deregulation in an effort to help ensure that smaller communities are provided
with the air service necessary to link them to the national air transportation sys-
tem. To the extent necessary, carriers may receive subsidies to operate to certain
EAS points. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 41731-41742 (West 1995) (original version at 49
U.S.C. § 1389 (1988)). -
- See 14 C.F.R. § 93.221 (1995); see also 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,180, 52,191,
52,196.
4 In describing "permanent" slots, the FAA explained that a "slot is not perma-
nent if it has been allocated for a short period of time and is'to be returned to
the appropriate scheduling committee." 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,183. The FAA
went on to note that the issue of whether a slot is "permanent" would generally
arise in the case of commuter slots since commuter scheduling committees would
frequently reallocate returned slots for short intervals pending the next sched-
uled permanent slot allocation. Id.
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the rule, as indicated by the records of the appropriate schedul-
ing committee.46
For purposes of determining which slots would be withdrawn
in the event capacity was reduced in the future or additional
slots were needed to fulfill international or EAS obligations, the
FAA assigned by lottery withdrawal priority numbers to each
slot.47 The FAA, however, exempted from the withdrawal provi-
sions carriers with a limited number of slots.48
46 Id. at 52,190; see also 14 C.F.R. § 93.215 (1995). The DOT acknowledged
that grandfathering slots would result in a benefit to incumbent carriers.
Although many parties opposed the financial windfall the incumbents would re-
°ceive as a result of the grandfather provision, the DOT determined that the one
time benefit was necessary to implement the buy-sell system and to minimize the
disruption of existing service. See 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,184. The DOT also
believed that such grandfather provisions recognized the "investments and com-
mitments in personnel, equipment, terminal development, and planning by ex-
isting carriers." Id. In addition, according to the DOT, the incumbent carriers
had already received the value of the slots at no cost and only a marginal increase
in value would result from the ability to sell such slots. Id. On reconsideration,
seasonal slots and slots for charter carriers were grandfathered to the same de-
gree as scheduled operator slots so that permanent slots that were held and oper-
ated by carriers for international service or on a seasonal basis in 1985 atJFK and
ORD as evidenced by scheduling committee and FAA records could continue to
be used by the carrier. 51 Fed. Reg. 21,708, 21,709, 21,712, 21,715 (1986). The
buy-sell rule requires operators that did not receive slots under the grandfather
provision for particular operations to make reservations for vacant slots for addi-
tional operations generally within 48 hours of use. Id. at 21,712. The revisions to
the buy-sell rule issued on reconsideration added a provision for administrative
allocation of certain types of vacant slots that will allow charter operators to make
reservations weeks or months in advance of use of the slot. Id.; see also 14 C.F.R.
§ 93.217(a)(5) (1995).
47 14 C.F.R. § 93.223 (1995); see also 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,192. These with-
drawal priority numbers are important in evaluating the value of slots. A low
number means a slot is vulnerable to withdrawal and a high number gives it more
protection.
48 On reconsideration of the buy-sell rule, the FAA advised that it would not
withdraw slots from carriers with eight or fewer non-international slots. However,
the FAA stated that carriers with less than eight slots could not enter into lease
arrangements to protect another carrier's slots from withdrawal. 51 Fed. Reg.
21,708, 21,714, 21,716. The FAA further clarified the limitations on the protec-
tion from withdrawal of slots held by carriers with less than eight slots by specifi-
cally requiring the holding carrier to operate the slots itself. 54 Fed. Reg. 34,904,
34,905 (1989) (use requirement prevents larger carriers from transferring slots
vulnerable to withdrawal to carriers exempt from withdrawal and leasing them
back). In 1992 the withdrawal exemption was amended to cover carriers with
twelve or less slots at a particular high density airport. 57 Fed. Reg. 37,308
(1992); 14 C.F.R. § 93.223(c) (3). The FAA has, however, granted exemptions to
carriers that would qualify for this protection but for the fact that they trans-
ferred their slots to financial institutions in order to obtain financing and lease
the slots back for use. See In re America West Airlines, Inc. and BT Commercial
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The buy-sell rule also implemented a use-or-lose provision 49 in
the hope that marginally used slots would be freed up for carri-
ers seeking entry to airports or seeking to expand their presence
at airports.5" To monitor slot usage, the FAA required.that re-
ports be filed fourteen days after the end of each two month
period, with the obligation to file the report imposed on the
holder of the slot. 1 If a review of these reports indicated that
the minimum usage requirements were not met, the FAA could
withdraw the slot. It was contemplated that slots made available
through the application of the use-or-lose provision, slots volun-
tarily returned to the FAA, and newly created slots resulting
from increases in air traffic control capacity would be allocated
by lotteries expected to occur not more than every six months.52
Corporation, FAA Exemption No. 5518 (Sept. 9, 1992) and FAA Exemption No.
5340 (Sept. 13, 1991) (exemptions from slot withdrawal provisions of 14 C.F.R.
§§ 93.217, 93.223 granted to America West Airlines, Inc. (America West)).
49 14 C.F.R. § 93.227 (1995). This provision required that slots be used 65% of
the time over a two-month period to avoid recall by the FAA. The FAA, however,
specifically included a provision that would allow it to waive the use-or-lose rule
in unusual circumstances outside of the control of a carrier (such as, the ground-
ing of an aircraft type or protracted severe weather) which exists for a substantial
period (defined by the FAA as nine days). 14 C.F.R. § 93.227(j); see also 51 Fed.
Reg. 21,708, 21,716. In certain circumstances that did not otherwise meet the
regulatory definition of unusual circumstances, the FAA, as a matter of policy,
has applied the use-or-lose rule with flexibility. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 7213 (1996)
(slots unused during a 1996 blizzard treated as used). 58 Fed. Reg. 21,095 (1993)
(slots unused during a 1993 blizzard treated as used); 14 C.F.R. § 93.227(1) (slots
held on Thanksgiving Day, the Friday following Thanksgiving, and December 24
through January 1 treated as used).
50 See 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,188-89 (the use-or-lose provision prevents the
holding of "pocket" slots for speculative purposes and maximizes utilization of
airport capacity).
51 14 C.F.R. § 93.227(i).
52 Originally, the FAA set aside 15% of the slots for a preferred allocation to
new entrants and limited incumbents. 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,185. This was
increased to 25% in 1986. 51 Fed. Reg. 21,708, 21,716. For purposes of the slot
restrictions, the term "new entrant" is focused solely on the carrier's operations at
the particular high density airport. In other words, even if a carrier has been in
existence for many years, operates at other high density airports, or both, if it
does not operate at the specific high density airport in question and has never
sold or given up a slot at that airport after December 16, 1985, it is a new entrant.
14 C.F.R. § 93.213(a) (1) (1995). Limited incumbents are those carriers which
operate fewer than twelve air carrier or commuter slots (in any combination) not
counting international or EAS slots but including the number of slots which the
carrier has had at the airport since December 16, 1985 (but which it may have
transferred or lost as a result of nonuse). 14 C.F.R. § 93.213(a) (5) (1995). The
category of limited incumbents initially included only those carriers with eight or
fewer slots at a particular high density airport. 51 Fed. Reg. 21,708, 21,714.
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The last lottery was held in 1989, and there appear to be no
prospects for a lottery anytime in the foreseeable future.
As noted previously, the initial allocation of slots represented
a financial windfall for incumbent carriers, a fact which the FAA
acknowledged but believed was necessary to minimize disrup-
tion to operations at these airports.53 In an effort to minimize
the impact this grandfather provision would have on carriers
seeking entry to these airports and to diminish the advantage.
held by the incumbents, the FAA also proposed (and. shortly
thereafter adopted) an SFAR providing for a one-time with-
drawal of five percent of the carrier slots at ORD, LGA, and
DCA. These slots would then be reallocated to new entrants
and limited incumbents along with all other slots not perma-
nently allocated to carriers on December 16, 1985. 5' No slots
would be withdrawn from limited incumbents and no more than
ten percent of a carrier's slots at a particular airport would be
withdrawn.55 JFK was exempted from this withdrawal because of
the large number of international operations and because it had
accommodated new entrants.56 Commuter slots were also ex-
cluded from the withdrawal because of the historical success of
the commuter scheduling committees in accommodating new
entrants.5 7 Finally, slots deemed necessary by the DOT for EAS
would not be withdrawn.5 8
The FAA established guidelines for the one-time five percent
withdrawal lottery.5 9 Specifically, the FAA required that a mini-
mum number of slots in each controlled hour be placed in the
reallocation pool in order to ensure that slots would be available
throughout the day for the new entrants and limited incum-
53 See supra note 46.
54 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,184; see also 50 Fed. Reg. 52,199, 52,199 (1985) (pro-
posed Dec. 20, 1985) (NPRM proposing withdrawal of slots for reallocation).
The FAA noted that although it was appropriate to permit carriers to retain a
large percentage of slots held by them, this method of allocation could place new
entrant carriers and incumbent carriers with a limited number of slots at a disad-
vantage since the only way they could obtain additional slots would be to
purchase them. Id. at 52,200. It should be noted that although the FAA referred
to the purchase of slots as the only method to obtain slots, a lucrative market in
leasing slots developed as a result of the buy-sell rule. The NPRM proposing the
withdrawal of slots was finalized on March 12, 1986. SFAR No. 48, 51 Fed. Reg.
8632 (1986).
55 See SFAR No. 48, 51 Fed. Reg. 8632, 8639.
56 Id. at 8633.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 8635.
59 Id. at 8635-37.
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bents.6 ° Carriers were given the opportunity to identify' the slots
to be withdrawn. If they failed to respond in a timely fashion,
however, the FAA made the selection for them.61
Although the FAA granted the right to buy, sell, and other-
wise trade slots, the FAA stated (and continues to state to this
day) that there are no proprietary rights created in slots6 2-a
subject which has been a topic of discussion by the bankruptcy
courts.63
60 Id. at 8636.
61 Id. at 8638. Carrier representatives were given five minutes to designate the
slots to be withdrawn before the FAA would make the selection.
62 In the NPRM proposing the buy-sell rule, the FAA described slots as a tem-
porary creation of FAA regulations which do not confer a long term right. It
noted that slots can be taken away from a carrier in accordance with FAA regula-
tions and that there is no guarantee that slots will be required at any airport for
any particular period of time. 49 Fed. Reg. 23,788, 23,792. The FAA further
noted that in In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 942 (5th Cir. 1983), the
court held that slots are not property in themselves and that even if a limited
proprietary interest arose from the allocation of slots, transfers or dispositions of
such slots would nevertheless require FAA approval. 49 Fed. Reg. at 23,788,
23,792 (citing Braniff, 700 F.2d at 942). In the preamble to the final rule, the
FAA stated "[t]his amendment does not create proprietary rights in slots." 50
Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,182. The regulations governing the withdrawal of slots also
state that " [s]lots do not represent a proprietary right but represent an operating
privilege subject to absolute FAA control." 14 C.F.R. § 93.223(a).
63 In In re McClain Airlines, Inc., 80 B.R. 175 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1987), the court
determined that slots are property of the estate of the debtor airline which has
been granted slots, despite § 1371 (i) of the Federal Aviation Act which prohib-
ited the CAB from creating property rights in air transportation. Notwithstand-
ing the FAA's disclaimer of "property rights" in slots as set forth in 14 C.F.R.
§ 93.223 (a), the court reasoned that such a position must be considered in light
of current administrative developments (that is, the buy-sell rule which permits
carriers to purchase or sell slots). McClain, 80 B.R. at 177. As the court noted,
the enactment of rules to "minimize government intervention" and provide
"maximum reliance on market forces to determine slot distribution" in
§ 93.221 (a) is difficult to reconcile with the agency's claim in § 93.223(a) that
such free market items do not constitute property rights. Id. at 179. In evaluat-
ing the property rights in the context of a bankruptcy, the court determined that
if the government had properly and permanently withdrawn slots from a debtor
airline under appropriate federal administrative law, the debtor and debtor's es-
tate lost rights in such slots. Id. at 179. The First Circuit in In re Gull Air, Inc.,
890 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1989), also discounted the FAA's statement that the buy-
sell rule created no proprietary rights in slots. The First Circuit referred to the
McClain decision which provided that by granting carriers the right to buy and
sell slots with the intent of maximizing reliance on market forces and minimizing
government involvement in slot distribution, the FAA grants to carriers a limited
proprietary right in slots. Gull Air, 890 F.2d at 1259-60. Although the FAA at-
tempted to refute such proprietary rights through its pronouncement in 14
C.F.R. § 93.223(a), the court concluded that such a statement does not detract
from the reality that a market for these slots exists and that carriers possess a
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III. THE CURRENT HIGH DENSITY RESTRICTIONS
Since 1985, the high density rule has been amended numer-
ous times with respect to, among other things, the controlled
hours at the airports,64 the number of authorized operations,65
the size of aircraft operated in each class of slot,6 6 and the mini-
mum percentage of slot use required to avoid forfeiture. 67 As it
now stands, the high density rule includes the following signifi-
cant provisions:
1. It applies to operations at ORD between 6:45 a.m. and 9:15
p.m., at JFK between 3:00 p.m. and 7:59 p.m., and to all opera-
tions at LGA and DCA, with the number of slots varying from
airport to airport.68 During these hours scheduled carriers must
proprietary right in allocated slots even if that interest is encumbered by condi-
tions imposed by FAA regulations. Gull Air, 890 F.2d at 1260. Applying this con-
cept, the court determined that any proprietary interest held by the airline in the
slots terminated automatically when the airline failed to use the slots for the req-
uisite period of time and that the withdrawal of the slots by the FAA did not
violate the automatic stay contained in the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1260-61.64 49 Fed. Reg. 8237, 8237 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 93.123) (in-
creased controlled hours at ORD).
65 45 Fed. Reg. 62,406, 62,406 (1980) (FAA changed hourly allocation of oper-
ations at DCA from 40 for air carriers, 8 for commuters, and 12 for general avia-
tion to 36 for air carriers, 12 for commuters, and 12 for general aviation); 46 Fed.
Reg. 58,036 (1981) (authorizes 37 operations per hour for air carriers and per-
mits scheduled air taxis at DCA to use extra sections); 49 Fed. Reg. 8237, 8237
(increases the number of operations permitted at ORD, JFK, and LGA and
changes allocations among the various classes of users).
66 See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 62,406, 62,406 (requires aircraft with a maximum of 56
or more passengers to use certificated air carrier slots and those with less than 56
seats to use commuter slots); 54 Fed. Reg. 34,904, 34,904 (1989) (to be codified
at 14 C.F.R. § 93.123(c) (1) (changes the maximum passenger seating capacity for
operations in scheduled commuter slots from less than 56 seats to less than 75
seats (with a limitation to reciprocating and turboprop aircraft)); 54 Fed. Reg.
39,843, 39,843 (1989) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 93.123(c)(1)) (suspends
change in definition of commuter slot to extent it would prohibit the operation
of turbojet aircraft with a maximum certificated seating capacity of less than 56);
56 Fed. Reg. 41,200, 41,200 (1991) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 93.221(e)) (per-
mits up to 25% of each operato-'s commuter slots at ORD to be used by aircraft
having a maximum seating capacity of up to 110 passenger seats); 58 Fed. Reg.
39,610, 39,613 (1993) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 93.221(e)) (increases per-
centage of commuter slots that may be used with 110 seat aircraft to 50% but
adopts a maximum takeoff weight limit of 126,000 pounds).
67 57 Fed. Reg. 37,308, 37,310 (1992) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 93.227(a))
(increases minimum slot use requirements from 65% to 80%); see also 57 Fed.
Reg. 52,590, 52,590 (1992) (delayed effective date of increased minimum use
requirements untilJan. 1, 1993).
68 14 C.F.R. §§ 93.123, 93.133 (1995). At LGA and ORD and during the sum-
mer season atJFK, slots are allocated for specific thirty minute intervals. At DCA
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have slots to support each takeoff and landing. With the excep-
tion of LGA and the summer scheduling season at JFK, there is
no distinction between arrival and departure slots.
69
2. Slots are allocated among three classes of users-air carri-
ers, commuters, and other operators (general aviation and char-
ters).70 Commuter slots can only be used to support the
operation ofjets with less than fifty-six seats and turbojet aircraft
with less than seventy-five seats. 71 At ORD, the FAA will permit
up to fifty percent of a carrier's commuter slot holdings to be
used for the operation of aircraft having an actual seating con-
figuration for 110 or fewer passengers and having a maximum
takeoff weight of 126,000 pounds.72 Carriers wishing to use
commuter slots for this purpose must obtain prior approval
from air traffic control.73 An equivalent provision does not exist
for commuter slots at the other high density airports. Except
for the limited flexibility for commuter slots at ORD, air carnier
slots are required to operate jet aircraft with fifty-six seats 'or
more and turbojet aircraft with seventy-five seats or more.
3. All permanent slots may be sold, leased, or otherwise
traded except slots designated for EAS and international ser-
vice.74 If the EAS and international slots will' not be used for a
two-week period, they must be returned to the FAA.75 Interna-
tional slots in different hours may be traded on a one-for-one
and during the winter season at JFK, slots are allocated for specific hourly inter-
vals. 14 C.F.R. § 93.123; see also 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25,
at 31.
69 See id.
70 14 C.F.R, § 93.123(a).
71 Id. § 93.123(c).
72 Id. § 93.221(e).
73 Id. § 93.221 (e) (3). A carrier must notify air traffic control (ATC) at least 75
days in advance of the planned startup date of the operation of 110-seat aircraft
in a commuter slot. The notification must include the slot number, proposed
time of operation, aircraft type and series, actual seating configuration, and
planned commencement date. ATC will approve or disapprove the use of such
aircraft in a commuter slot within 45 days of receipt of the notice. If the planned
commencement date is delayed by 30 days, a revised notice must be filed with
ATC.
74 Id. § 93.221 (1995) which, as a general rule, permits slots to be bought, sold,
or leased for any consideration and any time period. The FAA, however, prohib-
its parties from buying, selling, leasing, or otherwise transferring EAS or interna-
tional slots, except for limited one-for-one trades at the same airport. 14 C.F.R.
§§ 93.217, 93.219 (1995).
75 Id. §§ 93.217(a) (3), 93.219(b).
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basis at the same airport between two independent air carriers
(i.e., not commonly owned).76
4. Slots must be used eighty percent of the time over a two-
month period or they will be withdrawn by the FAA. 77 The use-
or-lose rules are intended to ensure that slots, and therefore ser-
vice, at high density airports are maximized.78
5. The FAA has acknowledged that the rigid application of
the minimum use requirements in bankruptcy cases would im-
pose time pressures that the bankruptcy proceedings cannot re-
alistically accommodate. 7  In an effort to balance these
concerns against the need to establish a precise date when un-
used slots would revert to the FAA, the FAA adopted special
rules to address bankruptcies.8°
a. To ensure that EAS will be maintained to smaller com-
munities, the FAA may, within thirty days after an operator
files for bankruptcy, recall all slots of that operator which
have been used to provide EAS if the DOT determines that
the slots are required to provide substitute EAS to or from
the same points.81
b. Aside from the possible withdrawal of slots to maintain
EAS, the remainder of the bankruptcy-oriented slot provi-
sions relate to relief from the use-or-lose rule. In effect, the
FAA has recognized that slots are valuable assets of the
debtor's estate and, by the flexibility granted under the
rules, gives the bankrupt carrier the opportunity to con-
76 The FAA will, however, permit an international slot held by a carrier to be
traded to another carrier for a slot (domestic or international) on a one-for-one
basis at the same airport. The trades must occur between two separate (that is,
not commonly owned) airlines and must be for slots in a different hour or half-
hour period. Id. § 93.217(a) (2). Common ownership is deemed to exist if one
party owns 50% or more of the carriers or if one carrier owns 50% or more of
another. Id. § 93.213(5) (c). The FAA will permit similar trades for EAS slots
subject to the same common ownership restriction. Id. § 93.219(a).
77 Id. § 93.227(a).
78 50 Fed. Reg. at 52,180, 52,189 (1995).
79 The FAA first acknowledged the need for special use-or-lose rules to accom-
modate bankruptcy situations when it adopted the buy-sell rule. Id. at 52,193; see
also 56 Fed. Reg. 46,674, 46,678-79 (1991) (proposed Sept. 13, 1991) (proposed
to amend rules relating to bankruptcies to account for different types and aspects
of bankruptcy proceedings and reaffirmed the need for a precise date when un-
used slots will revert to the FAA while providing adequate period for sale under
bankruptcy procedures). The proposed bankruptcy provisions were adopted un-
changed by the FAA. See 57 Fed. Reg. 37,308, 37,310.
80 See 14 C.F.R. § 93.227(d).
81 Id. § 93.227(h).
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tinue its operations or to sell its slots. Specifically, the FAA
in bankruptcy cases provides the following time frames for
relief from the use-or-lose rule:
i. A one-time sixty-day exemption from the date the
initial bankruptcy petition is filed during which the
use-or-lose rule will not apply;82
ii. A thirty-day exemption from the date of submis-
sion of information required by Hart-Scott-Rodino or
other federal law regarding a proposed transfer of as-
sets (provided the information is submitted more than
thirty days after the initial filing for bankruptcy and
provided that the slot has not become subject to with-
drawal under any other provision of the slot rules) ;83
iii. A thirty-day exemption following total cessation
of operations at a slot controlled airport provided that
the slot has not become subject to withdrawal under
any other provision of the slot rules;84
iv. Thirty days after the parties to the proposed
transfer of any such slot comply with requests for addi-
tional information from the federal government in
connection with the antitrust, economic impact, or
similar investigation of the transfer provided that (1)
the original notice of the transfer is filed with the fed-
eral agency within thirty days after the carrier ceases
operation at the airport; (2) the request for informa-
tion is made within ten days of the filing of the notice
by the carrier; (3) the carrier submits the additional
information to the federal agency within fifteen days of
the request by such agency; and (4) any slot to be
transferred has not become subject to withdrawal
under another provision of the slot rules;85 and
v. Recognizing that (1) purchasers of slots from
bankrupt carriers cannot always implement service im-
mediately and the ramifications if the use-or-lose rule
were rigidly applied; and (2) start-up waivers could be
granted by the FAA to purchasers of slots in bank-
82 Id. § 93.227(d) (1) (i).
83 Id. § 93.227(d) (1) (ii).
84 Id. § 93.227(d) (2) (i).
85 Id. § 93.227(d) (2) (ii) (A)-(D).
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ruptcy although no set time frame or guarantee of a
waiver is provided by the rules.86
In general terms, these provisions make.clear that, notwith-
standing the FAA's statements that slots are not proprietary
rights, the FAA has accepted the fact that slots by their nature
and by virtue of the buy-sell rule are proprietary rights that will
be protected by bankruptcy courts.8 7 Basically, as long as a car-
rier has complied with the FAA's slot regulations and the FAA
has not withdrawn the slots in accordance with its rules, the slots
are considered property of the estate to be treated as any other
property, subject to the FAA's transfer requirements.
IV. THE SLOT MARKET CREATED BY THE
- BUY-SELL RULE
A. THE SALE AND LEASE OF SLOTS
The buy-sell rule contemplated that carriers would transfer
slots they did not need, thereby providing access to the high
density airports to carriers lacking slots.88 Although the buy-sell
86 In the course of amending the provisions of the high density rule relating to
the applicability of the use-or-lose rule in cases of bankruptcy, the FAA stated that
it has granted waivers from the use-or-lose provisions to purchasers of slots in
bankruptcy, but indicated that it was unwilling to create a regulatory provision
automatically granting such relief. See 57 Fed. Reg. 37,308, 37,310.
87 See discussion supra notes 62, 63. Although the FAA has acknowledged that
property interests in slots have been recognized by bankruptcy courts in spite of
the FAA's regulatory pronouncement that slots do not constitute property, the
FAA nevertheless continues its attempt to prevent claims that slots constitute
property. Specifically, in the course of denying an exemption, to United Air
Lines, Inc. (United) that would have prevented the withdrawal of its slots at ORD
for international service, the FAA stated that although bankruptcy courts may
have recognized property interests in slots, property interests have not been
found in any other context. See In re United Air Lines, Inc., FAA Docket No.
27151, at 5 (Mar. 30, 1993) (denial of exemption). To emphasize the point, the
FAA stated "[n]o degree of reliance, however large or unfounded, can create a
property interest in slots when the rule and historical administration by DOT so
clearly establish the concept that slots are not property." Id.
88 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,185-86. The DOT did not believe that larger carri-
ers would use their resources and the flexibility provided by the rule to dominate
the markets and thereby create concentration. at high density airports. The
DOT's belief was based on what it perceived to be a lack of business incentive and
the impracticality of obtaining monopoly control. Specifically, the DOT believed
that a carrier would not have the incentive to acquire and use a slot merely to
preempt another carrier since the slot holding carrier could maximize its profits
by selling the slot to another carrier which is offering a highly valued service and
therefore would be willing to pay for the slot. Id. Reality has shown that the
DOT's beliefs were quite naive.
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rule specifically contemplates that slots may be bought, sold,
leased, or traded, the FAA allows any type of transfer as long as
the transfer requirements are met.8" While the FAA's regula-
tions are relatively straightforward and easily applied to the
purchase and sale of slots, the regulations are not as clear in the
area of leasing slots or using slots as security-transactions that
likely represent a.larger number of slot transactions than sales. °0
In effect, the unwritten guidelines of the FAA must be fleshed
out, and as the slot market continues to develop, the FAA faces
many cases of first impression.
Regardless of the type of transfer, transfers must be processed
through the FAA and reflected in the FAA's records. 91 In order
to process the request, the parties are required to submit certain
factual information relating to the parties and the slots.9 2 The
FAA requires the following: (1) the slot is from the transferor's
then-approved FAA base; (2) written evidence of the transferor's
consent; and (3) the recipient must refrain from. using the slot
until written confirmation has been received from the FAA. 93
This written confirmation typically takes approximately four
days, although in some cases it may take less, and in others far
more.
89 See 14 C.F.R. § 93.221 (1995).
90 Leases are frequently a preferred method of slot transfer since it provides
carriers with the flexibility necessary to satisfy short term needs that do not war-
rant the purchase or sale of slots. The ability to operate 110-seat aircraft in 50%
of the commuter slots held by a carrier at ORD, has also likely resulted in a lucra-
tive leasing market due to the 50% limitation. Because of this limitation, a pur-
chaser of commuter slots at ORD would need to buy two commuter slots to
operate one of them with 110-seat aircraft. As a result, small carriers that do not
operate larger aircraft can lease a commuter slot thatcan be operated with larger
aircraft to another operator for money, slots, or any combination. Although the
FAA does not permit a carrier to transfer the "conversion" right for the slot, a two
way lease can arrive at the same result. The benefit to the smaller carriers at
ORD and the value of their commuter slots is therefore increased by the provi-
sion allowing the operation of larger aircraft in these slots.
91 Id. § 93.221(a)(1).
92 Id. This provision requires that requests for transfers specify the names of
the transferor and recipient; the business address and telephone number of the
persons representing the parties; whether the slot is an arrival or departure slot;
the date the slot was acquired by the transferor; the section of the subpart under
which the slot was allocated to the transferor; whether the slot has been used by
the transferor for international or EAS; whether the slot will be used by the trans-
feree for international or EAS; and the withdrawal priority number assigned to
the slot.
93 Id. § 93.221(a)(2)-(4).
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In the case of leases, certain guidelines must be observed
notwithstanding the fact that they do not appear in the regula-
tions. First, the lease must specify a set term; it cannot be open
ended. If there is no set term, the FAA assumes that the opera-
tor and holder status of the slot are being transferred by the
transferor-thus, the transfer is treated as a sale. If the lease
includes an option to renew, an additional filing would need to
be made with the FAA to extend the lease. At the end of the
specified term the FAA will automatically transfer the operator
status back to the holder of the slot.
The FAA's mechanical requirements likely stem, at least in
part, from the fact that it does not want to be the arbitrator of a
dispute between the parties. If a lease is being terminated early,
both parties have to agree before the FAA will transfer the slot
back to the lessor (or to a third party). Even if a default occurs,
the FAA will not transfer the operator status of the slot back to
the holder without the agreement of the lessee-which as a
practical matter would be difficult to obtain. It is likely that
nothing short of a court order would facilitate the early termina-
tion of the lease and the return of the slot to the lessor when the
lessee/operator does not agree to the return. The FAA has not
yet faced such a situation although it certainly has faced disputes
between lessors and lessees.
Because new entrants and limited incumbents receive a pref-
erence in any FAA lottery of available slots,94 additional transfer
restrictions are imposed on those slots. 95 Specifically, for the
first twenty-four months after the new entrant or limited incum-
bent obtains a slot in a lottery, the FAA will only permit that slot
to be transferred by trade for one or more slots at the same air-
port or to other new entrants or limited incumbents and only if
the carrier awarded the slot in the lottery used it for a minimum
of sixty days.96 The same transfer restriction attaches to any slot
acquired by the new entrant or limited incumbent as a result of
a trade.9 7 The transfer restriction is removed after documenta-
tion supporting twenty-four months of continuous use has been
submitted to the FAA.98 If the criteria are not met, the FAA will
void any trade involving the lottery slot and withdraw the lottery
94 See id. § 93.225(h) (1995); see also supra note 52.
95 See id. § 93.221(a)(5).
96 Id. § 93.221 (a) (5) (i), (iii).
97 Id. § 93.221 (a) (5) (i).
98 Id.
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slot99 (which may now be in the hands of the new entrant's
transferee). These restrictions are intended to prevent carriers
from participating in lotteries merely to obtain slots for the pur-
pose of selling or leasing them.100
B. Tm VALUE OF SLOTS
The access to high density airports which slots provide has al-
ways resulted in a value to the carrier holding the slots. The
buy-sell rule, however, has enabled parties to take greater advan-
tage of this value. In evaluating the value of slots, four basic
measures are used.10 1 First, to an incumbent airline, the eco-
nomic value of its slots is equal to the discounted present value
of the net profit stream from the fare premium it is able to
charge as a consequence of its slot operations at three of the
four high density airports. 0 2 Second, the sales value of the slot
is dependent upon a prospective buyer's assessment of the in-
9 Id.
100 The transfer restrictions placed on slots received in lotteries stems from the
concern that new entrants and limited incumbents would obtain these slots
merely for a financial benefit. In 1988 the DOT and the FAA noted:
Since the rule was first issued, a total of 140 slots have been made
available to new entrants or limited incumbents (holding less than
8 slots). Of the carriers which received the 140 slots, many if not
most of the carriers sold those slots in the minimum time permitted
or otherwise failed to use them. Of the 140 slots allocated to new
entrants and carriers with less than 8 slots in the lotteries to date,
only 15 are in use by the carriers that obtained the slots. Others
were used by carriers which subsequently merged into larger carri-
ers, but most of the 140 slots were sold or were returned to the FAA
without operation.
53 Fed. Reg. 51,628, 51,629 (1988) (proposed Dec. 22, 1988); see also Secretary's
Task Force on Competition in the U.S. Domestic Airline Industry, Airports, Air
Traffic Control, and Related Concerns (Impact on Entry), 2-15 (1990) [hereinafter
1990 DOT Competition Study]. The FAA increased the 60-day use requirement
to a 90-day requirement and then to a 24-month use requirement in an effort to
address this concerh. See 56 Fed. Reg. 46,674 (1991) (proposed Sept. 13, 1991);
57 Fed. Reg. 37,308, 37,309 (final rule); 14 C.F.R. § 93.221 (a) (5) (iii).
101 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 17. The DOT previously
examined the value of slots in 1990 as part of its evaluation of competition in the
domestic airline industry. See 1990 DOT Competition Study, supra note 100, at 2-
8, 2-9, app. B. For an additional discussion of the economic consequences of the
buy-sell rule, see Robert M. Hardaway, The FAA "Buy-Sell" Slot Rule: Airline Deregu-
lation at the Crossroads, 52J. Air L. & Com. 1, 25-30 (1986).
102 The DOT noted in its report to Congress that a fare premium appears to
exist at ORD, LGA, and DCA, but not atJFK. 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS,
supra note 25, at 117. This was not the first time the DOT acknowledged the
existence of a fare premium at the high density airports. See 1990 DOT Competi-
tion Study, supra note 100, at 2-10.
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cremental earning power afforded by slot access and bargaining
power. Specifically, value will vary with reference to the number
of slots involved, the time periods which the slots reflect, and
the particular high density airport to which they provide ac-
cess."' 3 Third, the collateral value of slots depends on how they
are appraised by the lender. The value will likely reflect a sub-
stantial discount because of the risk associated with such collat-
eral both in terms of the possibility of withdrawal for non-use or
elimination of slots due to an elimination qf the high density
rule. 10 4 Finally, value may be reflected by the accounting treat-
ment of slot value. This treatment, however, varies. For exam-
ple, some airlines carry slots on their balance sheet at cost
bundled with gates and other assets while others book the slots
they purchased, but exclude those obtained under the grandfa-
ther provisions of the buy-sell rule.10 5
Although types of value may be readily identified, discerning
the specific commercial terms is more difficult since the FAA
does not require the parties to specify the commercial terms of
slot transactions.1 0 6 As a result, the monetary value placed on
slots is largely determined by reference to anecdotal informa-
tion or information reported to or by regulatory agencies such
as the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), the FAA or
DOT, 10 7 in trade publications,' Congressional hearings, 10 9
103 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 17. It has been acknowl-
edged that a package of several slots at a high density airport likely have a greater
value on a per slot basis than a single slot since it would enable the recipient to
build a greater market presence. See 1990 DOT Competition Study, supra note
100, at app. B-3, B-4 & n.5.
104 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 17.
105 Id. at 17-18.
106 The FAA requires only that a request to transfer slots provide the parties'
names, addresses, and telephone numbers; whether the slot is an arrival or depar-
ture slot; the date the slot was acquired by the transferor; the regulatory provision
pursuant to which the slot was acquired; whether the slot has been used for inter-
national or EAS operations, and whether the slot will be used for international or
EAS operations. See 14 C.F.R. § 93.221(a)(1).
107 Reno Air recently advised the DOT that the asking price for air carrier slots
at ORD was in excess of $1,000,000. See In re Reno Air, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 94-
9-30, at 4 (Sept. 20, 1994). As part of its 1990 study on competition in the domes-
tic airline industry, the DOT examined slot values and prices at the high density
airports. It noted that the general value of all slots'at the four high density air-
ports is approximately $3 billion or an average of $850,000 per slot. See 1990
DOT Competition Study, supra note 100, at 2-8. When accompanied by gates,
the value of slots may double. Id. As examples, the DOT referred to the acquisi-
tion by Pan Am of three gates and 32 slots at LGA for $65 million (a sale that was
required as a condition of the DOT's approval of Texas Air's acquisition of East-
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bankruptcy cases, or other litigation." Not surprisingly, the
value of slots has historically been tied to the type of slot; air
carrier slots which can be used for the operation of any size air-
craft and peak hour slots have the highest value. United itself
has acknowledged that peak hour slots at ORD have recently
traded for $2 million or more."1 When one considers that each
slot United deploys in its system at ORD generates on average
ern), an offer by America West to purchase 10 gates and 90 slots used by the
Eastern Shuttle from the Eastern bankruptcy for $375 million and the sale of
four ORD slots by Eastern to American for $1 million per slot. Id. at app. B-3, B-
4, B-10. One year earlier, America West advised the FAA that slot prices at DCA
average in the upper $600,000 range for single slots and during certain times of
the day the purchase price for a single slot is $1 million. At LGA, it advised that
the average price was in the mid-$400,000 range with certain slots being sold for
$700,000-$800,000, and at ORD, slots averaged approximately in the mid
$500,000 range for single slots with some being sold for $600,000. See High Den-
sity Traffic Airports, Slot Allocation and Transfer Methods, FAA Docket 25758 [herein-
after 1989 FAA High Density Rule Study], Comments of America West at 44-45.
108 In 1990 it was reported that a substantial portion of the $365 million
purchase price paid by the Trump Shuttle for the assets of the Eastern Shuttle, an
acquisition which included 92 air carrier slots, was allocated to the purchase of
the slots. In response to proposed legislation that would have repealed the high
density rule, the Pan Am Shuttle and the Trump Shuttle each claimed that ap-
proximately $70 million of each carrier's assets consisted of slots. See Pan Am,
Trump Say End of Slots Means End of Shuttles, AVIATION DArLY, July 19, 1990, at 115.
The acquisition by AMR Eagle, a subsidiary of American Airlines, Inc. (Ameri-
can), of 138 commuter slots from Britt Airways had a reported purchase price of
$34.5 million, or approximately $250,000 per slot. See Battle of Chicago.. ., COM-
MUTER, May 1989, at C7.
109 The House Aviation Subcommittee was advised of the price of slots during
the 1982 experiment. For example, during the six week experiment, People Ex-
press paid $2 million for 10 slots at DCA. 1985 Aviation Subcommittee Hearings,
supra note 31, at 73, 75 (testimony of Robert E. Cohn, General Counsel, People
Express). United purchased 12 slots at Denver in 1982 for $2.5 million. Id. at
205 (testimony of Rep. Richard Schulze). In 1982 an off-peak 11:00 p.m. slot at
LGA sold for $90,000, whereas peak slots sold for up to $250,000. Id. The DOT,
in reliance on information gained from periodicals, stated that slot prices during
the 1982 experiment were reported to range between $12,000 and $500,000.
The DOT noted, however, that the prices of slots during that period may have
been understated due to the uncertainty over the period of time that the FAA
would permit the transactions to stand. See 1990 DOT Competition Study, supra
note 100, at app. B-3.
110 In Valujet Airlines, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 95-CV-2896 (N.D.
Ga. filed Nov. 9, 1995), ValuJet stated that TWA offered to lease ten LGA slots to
Valujet at rates ranging from $1,000 per month to $10,000 per month. SeePlain-
tiff's Complaint 1 12-15, ValuJet Airlines (No. 95-CV-2896).
III See 1994 FAA Request for Comments, supra note 2, Comments of United
Air Lines, at 6; High Density Traffic Airports Rule (Allocation of International
Slots), Emergency Petition for Exemption of United Air Lines, Inc., at 8; (Feb. 9,
1993) [hereinafter 1993 United Emergency Petition]; see also 1994 FAA Request
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nearly $5 million in air transportation revenue annually,' 12 such
a price tag is not surprising. An added value of slots is that a
carrier can keep out its competitors."'
C. THE USE OF SLOTS AS COLLATERAL
Slots have also been used by many carriers as collateral for
financial obligations." 4 The use of slots by carriers as collateral,
however, raises additional questions. First, unlike the FAA Air-
craft Registry which has a well developed system for recording
security interests in aircraft and engines,' 15 the FAA Slot Admin-
istration Office does not record security interests. As a result,
the only practical way that the secured party can protect itself is
to require the carrier to transfer the slot to it. Such a transfer
would involve both holder (owner) and operator status. The se-
cured party then leases the slot back to the carrier. The net
result is that the secured party is listed as the holder, and the
carrier is listed as the operator.
for Comments, supra note 2, Comments of Toledo Express Airport, at 1 (slots at
ORD cost $2 million).
112 See 1993 United Emergency Petition, supra note 111, at 9-10.
113 See infra notes 128-43 and accompanying text.
114 Currently TWA operates slots held by Shawmut Bank, as trustee, as security
for TWA obligations. Slots are also held by State Street Bank & Trust Company
to secure Business Express' obligations; Citibank, N.A., as trustee, to secure
USAir Shuttle's obligations; and First Bank National Association, as trustee, and
Mitsubishi Bank Limited to secure Northwest Airlines' obligations. See General
Services Administration, FAA Slot Management System Summary of Holdings by
Carrier (slots held five or more days as of Dec. 29, 1995, Air Carrier Slots Only);
see also 1994 FAA Request for Comments, supra note 2, Comments of the City of
Chicago, at 17 (some slots at ORD have been treated as assets or collateral); In re
America West Airlines, Inc., and BT Commercial Corporation, FAA Exemption
No. 5518 (Sept. 9, 1992) (FAA granted exemption from international and EAS
withdrawal provisions for slots transferred by America West to BT Commercial
Corp (BT Commercial) as part of America West's debtor-in-possession financing
and leased by BT Commercial to America West).
115 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 44107 (West 1995) which provides for a system for record-
ing, among other things, documents executed for security purposes that affect an
interest in an aircraft or engine. The FAA implements this statutory provision in
14 C.F.R. part 49 which specifies the requirements for recording aircraft titles
and security documents at the FAA. Until filed, instruments eligible for recorda-
tion are not valid against persons having no knowledge of the interest. See 49
U.S.C.A. § 44108 (West 1995). As such, filing security interests in an aircraft or
engines in accordance with FAA requirements gives notice to the world of the
interest(s) claimed by the parties identified in such filings. See also Philko Avia-
tion, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406 (1983) (Congress intended the FAA Registry to
be a central clearing house for U.S. aircraft so that there will be ready access to
claims against, liens, or other legal interests in aircraft).
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The need to submit the documentation giving rise to the
transfer depends entirely upon the manner in which the slot
transfer request is worded. If a slot transfer request is submitted
which references the existence of certain documentation, but does
not state that the transfer is subject to the terms of the agree-
ments, the submission of the transaction documents is not re-
quired. If, however, the transfer request states that the slots are
transferred subject to a specified agreement, the FAA will require
the submission of the agreement and will only permit subse-
quent transfers in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
For example, if the agreement states that the operator may only
transfer a slot to specified carriers or that prior approval is re-
quired, the FAA will require that such conditions be satisfied.
The FAA, however, even if it has the agreements will not make
determinations of compliance with payment provisions, exist-
ence of defaults, or foreclosure rights. It will leave those deter-
minations to the parties or a court and will act as and when
directed.
Because the FAA's records are not required to reflect security
interests in slots, and references to security agreements are at
the option of the parties, determining the existence of a security
interest requires a bit of detective work. For example, the iden-
tity of the holder and the existence of the lease to the carrier is a
good indicator that the transaction is a security interest.
Although investigation may uncover this information, the ab-
sence of FAA rules or a developed system by the FAA for protect-
ing a party's interest in a slot being leased to a carrier or being
used as security makes slot transactions somewhat risky.
Perhaps one of the most significant issues in protecting slots is
ensuring that the eighty percent minimum use requirement is
met. What this means is that a daily slot must be used forty-eight
or forty-nine days during each two-month reporting period.
Daily slots operated by carriers that do not use them seven days
a week are at greatest risk.' Although some carriers return week-
end slots to the FAA so that the eighty percent usage can be
more easily met based on actual operations, most, others, and
particularly those with air carrier slots, seem to be less likely to
do so. Instead, they often seek to meet the eighty percent usage
requirement by leasing the slots to other carriers who need
them on those days. In this fashion the combined usage of the
slot exceeds the eighty percent minimum and therefore is not
subject to withdrawal.
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A suggested starting point when leasing or accepting slots as
security would be to determine the schedule that will be sup-
ported by the slot. In other words, if it is a daily slot, does the
carrier operate it daily? If the carrier does not operate it daily,
how often does it operate the slot? These questions help deter-
mine how much flexibility remains for flights that are cancelled
before the slot will be subject to withdrawal. Although the FAA
regulations enable the FAA to waive the minimum use require-
ments for highly unusual and unpredictable conditions beyond
the control of the slotholder that exist for a period of nine or
more days, the relief contemplated by this provision would not
be available for routine types of cancellations. As a result, the
closer the carrier's schedule is to the minimum use require-
ments, even assuming one hundred percent of the scheduled
flights are operated, the greater the risk that a slot may be with-
drawn and the security or value reflected by the slot lost.
Because withdrawn slots obviously have no value, as security
or otherwise, it is important that the operator have adequate
flexibility to meet the minimum use requirements. There is a
fine line between protecting the collateral and hamstringing the
operator so that it cannot deal with the slot in a fashion that
helps to avoid its withdrawal. Although it is not unusual to re-
quire a lender's approval before secured assets are transferred,
such a requirement, when it pertains to slots, is not always prac-
tical. For example, given the significant amount of trading that
sometimes occurs with weekend slots, the time required to ob-.
tain a lender's approval may prevent the slot from being used,
thereby increasing the risk of withdrawal for failure to meet the
eighty percent use rule. The operator is placed in an even more
difficult position if the documents provided to the FAA state
that slots may only be transferred with the lender's approval or
may only be transferred once. Such conditions on the operator
not only make it difficult to get FAA approval in time to permit
the slot to be used, but also cause carriers to seek slots from
other carriers that can more easily satisfy their operational
needs. In determining the requirements that will apply to an
operator, the important question is whether the requirements
that are intended to protect the interest in the slot will, in the
real world of airline operations, place the slot more at risk.
Lenders may want to consider establishing general guidelines by
which carriers may transfer slots on a short-term basis without




Another issue to consider is whether a carrier should be given
the flexibility to return slots to the FAA if they are routinely not
going to be used on certain days and alternative operators are
not available. Again, this question must be evaluated based on
knowledge of the carriers' operations and the markets involved.
Perhaps here it is easier to require prior approval or notice
before the slot is to be returned to the FAA. The important
thing is that the carrier and the lender must act quickly when it
is apparent that returning slots to the FAA for certain days is the
only way to protect the slots from withdrawal. Based on the ob-
vious importance of slots to a carrier's operations and the inabil-
ity to substitute gomething in its place, it is reasonable to assume
that a carrier will make its best effort to avoid forfeiture, even if
it is not the owner of the slot.
Because the FAA only requires slot usage reports to be filed
within fourteen days after the last day of each two-month pe-
riod, a6 it may be too late if the lessor or lender only monitors
the carrier's usage through a review of the reports. As a result,
lenders may want to monitor a-carrier's operations and schedule
changes on an ongoing basis to ensure that the eighty percent
minimum usage requirement will be met. Also, there should be
contingency plans if usage is low so that the slot will not be with-
drawn. It must be remembered,, however, that if the lease of
slots to the carrier has not terminated, the carrier must agree to
and sign any slot transfer to another carrier.1 17 In this regard, a
lender or lessor may wish to require the lessee to sign a docu-
ment authorizing the early termination of the lease or authoriz-
ing the transfer of the slot back to the lessor before any problem
arises. It should also be remembered that the obligation to file
usage reports is the obligation of the holder, not the opera-
tor.' 18 As such, the duty to file the report should be clearly spec-
ified in any agreement with the operator.
In assessing the value of slots, withdrawal priorities should
also be considered, since the slot rule permits a slot to be with-
drawn for international and EAS operations or air traffic control
requirements. 1 9 Even if a slot is not designated as an EAS slot,
if a carrier wishes to terminate service to an EAS market or to
transfer a slot used in such a market, the DOT may require that
116 14 C.F.R. § 93.227(i) (1995).
117 See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
118 14 C.F.R. § 93.227(i).
119 Id. § 93.223 (c) (2).
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the carrier transfer the slot to the replacement carrier. 12 0 It
does not matter that the carrier may use it to support service in
other markets. Any transfer of a slot used in an EAS market that
will deprive that market of service will be subject to an examina-
tion by the DOT to determine whether it would be injurious to
the EAS program. Although EAS slots are protected from with-
drawal (as are international slots),121 their transferability is also
more limited. 122 As a practical matter, however, because most of
the points covered by the EAS program are small communities,
EAS issues are more likely to arise with commuter slots that sup-
port small aircraft rather than with air carrier slots.
Also, although the FAA will not withdraw slots from -limited
incumbents for EAS or international operations,123 certain crite-
ria must be met for this exemption from withdrawal to apply.
Specifically, slots held and operated by a limited incumbent are
protected from withdrawal only as long as that carrier holds and
operates them. Thus, if as part of a transaction the carrier will
transfer the slots to the lender, an FAA exemption would be re-
quired to maintain the limited protection from withdrawal that
is granted to the carrier. The FAA has granted such relief where
a carrier transferred slots to a bank as part of the security for
financing. 24 This relief, however, would terminate if the opera-
tor or the holder were to transfer the slots. 25
Care must also be exercised if there is a trade involving a slot
obtained by a new entrant or limited incumbent in an FAA lot-
tery. As noted earlier,126 the carrier receiving the slot must use
the slot (or the slot received in the trade) for two years before its
transfer restrictions are removed. 127 If it fails to use the slot ob-
tained in the trade, the trade is void and the slot allocated in the
120 See In re Simmons Airlines, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 94-5-12 (May. 9, 1994).
In that order, the DOT required as a condition to Simmons Airlines, Inc. discon-
tinuing EAS in a particular market that Simmons transfer four ORD slots to the
replacement carrier. The DOT determined that § 419(b) (7) of the Federal Avia-
tion Act required Simmons to transfer slots to ensure that EAS continued in the
market since the replacement carrier could not otherwise provide the replace-
ment EAS. Id. at 2-3.
121 14 C.F.R. § 93.223(c) (2).
122 Id. §§ 93.217(a) (2), 93.219(a).
123 Id. § 93.223(c) (2).
124 See In reAmerica West Airlines, Inc. and BT Commercial Corporation, FAA
Exemption No. 5518 (Sept. 9, 1992) (exemption gianted to America West to
protect slots it transferred to BT Commercial).
125 Id. at 2.
126 See supra text accompanying notes 94-100.
127 14 C.F.R. § 93.221 (a) (5).
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lottery must be returned to the FAA even if it is no longer in the
hands of the initial recipient.
Although great value has been attached to slots, trading in
slots is a tricky proposition. The holder/owner of a slot runs the
risk of losing the slot if the operator does not use it adequately.
As such, non-carriers are often left relying on the carriers to pro-
tect the very collateral that secures loans or other obligations of
the carrier. The important thing to remember is that slots are
not like aircraft; some of the restrictions that may be placed on
aircraft will not work with slots and will, as a practical matter,
place the slot more at risk.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE BUY-SELL RULE
ON COMPETITION
Although the larger carriers appear to have derived great ben-
efit from the buytsell rule, the new entrants and limited incum-
bents-the very carriers expected to benefit from this market-
based mechanism-have not fared well. This stems primarily
from the fact that sales of large numbers of slots and sales by
carriers with substantial holdings are few and far between. The
large slot-holding carriers have instead used their slots as secur-
ity and gained great flexibility in meeting their needs both oper-
ationally and economically through the use of short-term leases.
After ten years of experience with the buy-sell rule, it is clear
that although the sale of slots is permitted and, in fact, sales
have occurred, the number of sales has declined.128 This reduc-
tion appears to be due to the fact that carriers do not want slots
to wind up in the hands of their competitors, 129 even if they do
128 The Senate Aviation Subcommittee has been advised that the number of
slots that have been sold since the implementation of the buy-sell rule has de-
creased. See Barriers to Competition in the Airline Industry: Hearings Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Aviation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 GAO
Testimony] (statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Director of Transportation Issues,
U.S. General Accounting Office). Specifically, it was noted that in 1986 an aver-
age of 128 air carrier slots were sold per quarter, while in 1988 the average
number of slots sold per quarter was reduced to 20. Id. Furthermore, although a
large number of slots were sold in 1986, these sales were required by the DOT as
a condition of Texas Air (New York Air's parent company) acquiring Eastern
Airlines so that Pan Am could implement a competitive shuttle in the Northeast
corridor. Id.
129 ValuJet Airlines has alleged existing carriers "can bar new competitive carri-
ers from operating at [LGA] by refusing to sell or lease excess slots to such air-
lines." See Plaintiff's Complaint 1 23, 25, ValuJet Airlines, Inc. v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., No. 95-CV-2896 (N.D. Ga. filed Nov. 9, 1995); see also Memoran-
dum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Application for Tempo-
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not need the slots for their own operations.13 ° In fact, the com-
petitive considerations and reluctance to transfer slots may be
greater when the potential buyer is a new entrant since it may be
more difficult to determine the market in which the slots will be
used due to the lack of a track record for the airline."3 ' The
importance of slots to the ability of a carier to mount competi-
tive operations at high density airports has been acknowledged
by the DOT.1 2
The competitive issues arising from the inability of new en-
trants to obtain slots is a critical part of the litigation com-
menced in late 1995 by Valujet Airlines, Inc. (Valujet) against
TWA and Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Delta).13 Valujet alleged that
carriers "can bar new competitive carriers from operating at
[LGA] by refusing to sell or lease excess slots to such airlines."1 34
rary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5-6, ValuJet
Airlines (No. 95-CV-2896) (the real reason behind TWA's desire to lease its slots
to Delta instead of Valujet and Delta's interest in the slots is to bar Valujet from
entering the LGA-Atlanta market); 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note
25, at 16 (incumbents are unwilling to sell slots to new entrants due to concerns
about the competitive consequences); 1994 FAA Request for Comments, supra
note 2, Comments of Midwest Express Airlines, Inc., at 17 (few incumbent carri-
ers are willing to sell slots to potential competitors); Id., Comments of the Port
Authority of New York & NewJersey, at 3 (new entrants have difficulty mounting
an effective competitive service since the airlines that hold the slots "are appar-
ently determined to keep control of them as evidenced by the lack of slot sales
and the high asking price"); 1989 GAO Testimony, supra note 128, at 14 (leasing of
slots enables the slotholder to prevent use of a slot by a direct competitor).
130 See 1990 DOT Competition Study,'supra note 100, at app. B-4 (carriers have
leased slots and not sold them even after they have reduced operations at the
high density airport).
131 See id. at 2-9. As the DOT appropriately noted, the inclusion of a non-com-
pete agreement as part of a slot sale would raise serious antitrust questions. Id: at
n.9.
132 Texas Air-Eastern Acquisition Case, D.O.T. Order No. 86-7-21, at 2-3, 12-13,
15-16, 19-20 (July 9, 1986) (the sale of a sufficient number of slots to enable Pan
Am to commence a shuttle service is a precondition of approval of the acquisi-
tion); Texas Air-Eastern Acquisition Case, D.O.T. Order No. 86-8-77, at 9-11
(Aug. 26, 1986) (disapproved the acquisition of Eastern by Texas Air in part on
the basis of Pan Am's lack of a sufficient number of slots to mount a competitive
shuttle service); Texas Air Corp., D.O.T. Order No. 86-9-53 (Sept. 18, 1986) (ten-
tatively approves Texas Air's acquisition of Eastern based on the decision of
Texas Air and Eastern to sell additional slots to Pan Am, thereby enabling Pan
Am to commence a competitive shuttle); Texas Air Corp., D.O.T. Order No. 86-
10-2 (Oct. 1, 1986) (approval of Texas Air's acquisition of Eastern).
133 Valujet Airlines, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 95-CV-2896 (N.D.
Ga. filed Nov. 9, 1995).
134 Plaintiff's Complaint 1 23, 25, ValuJet Airlines (No. 95-CV-2896). Valujet
has recently leased ten slots at LGA from Continental Airlines. See Valujet to
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In fact, Valujet asserted that the real reason behind both TWA's
desire to lease its slots to Delta instead of Valujet and Delta's
interest in leasing the slots was to bar Valujet from entering the
LGA-Atlanta market.135 In seeking a temporary restraining or-
der (TRO) to stop TWA from leasing its LGA slots to Delta,
Valujet asserted that TWA and Delta conspired to deny market
access to Valujet by TWA leasing LGA slots to Delta instead of
Valujet, thereby violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. Valujet
further asserted that because Delta is the only carrier in the non-
stop LGA-Atlanta market, Delta's acquisition of the LGA slots
from TWA violates section 2 of the Sherman Act since it results
in Delta wrongfully monopolizing the LGA-Atlanta market. 136
In denying Valujet's motion for a TRO, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Georgia determined that
while Valujet's antitrust claims were troubling, they were not suf-
ficiently developed to determine whether Valujet had a reason-
able chance of succeeding on the merits, as is required to issue a
TRO. 13 7
Although the antitrust issues in Valujet Airlines are not yet de-
cided, the case highlights the fact that the FAA's belief that the
use-or-lose rule in conjunction with the antitrust laws would
cause operators to sell marginal slots to other carriers138 may
have been somewhat naive, a fact which the DOT itself appears
to have recognized, albeit a little too late.1 39
Launch Atlanta-New York Service with New Slots, AVIATION DAmLY, Mar. 20, 1996, at
452.
135 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Applica-
tion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
5-6, ValuJet Airlines (No. 95-CV-2896).
136 Id.
137 ValuJet Airlines, No. 95-CV-2896, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 1995).
138 Although Valujet has leased ten slots at LGA from another carrier, it is
continuing to pursue the antitrust claims against TWA and Delta. See Valujet to
Launch Atlanta-New York Service With New Slots, supra note 134, at 452. When it
adopted the buy-sell rule, the DOT agreed with the comments submitted by the
FTC which stated that the application of the use-or-lose provisions in conjunction
with existing antitrust laws would be sufficient to deter anticompetitive behavior.
50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,186; see also Hardaway, supra note 101, at 68-70.
139 As the DOT noted in its study on competition in the domestic airline indus-
try, the slot aftermarket has few sellers and the dominant carriers tend to buy
slots, not sell them. See 1990 DOT Competition Study, supra note 100, at 2-16, 2-
17; see also 1994 FAA Request for Comments, supra note 2, Comments of Midwest
Express Airlines, at 3, 4 (competitors have a "buy, never sell" position). In fact,
many interested parties are frequently not made aware of the availability of slots.
Valujet asserted that the trading that does occur happens at quarterly meetings
of the Airline Reservation and Reporting Committee, and slots are generally not
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Reality has shown that the use-or-lose rule does not flesh out
marginal slots. Instead, short term leases are frequently used to
meet the minimum use requirement140 since the leasing mecha-
nism also limits the competitor's ability to gain a permanent
foothold at the airport. Large carriers may also "park" excess air
carrier slots with their affiliated commuter airlines or code-shar-
ing partners to keep them out of the hands of their competi-
tors-something that new ,entrants and limited incumbents
vigorously protest.1 4 1 Given the enhanced value of slots under
the buy-sell rule, the large carriers have become stronger, and
the new entrants and limited incumbents weaker.
It is partly because of the concern for the competitive impact
on new entrants and limited incumbents that the slot restric-
tions and high density rule are continually being examined. 142
made available to non-members. See Plaintiff's Complaint 1 7, ValuJet Airlines
(No. 95-CV-2896). One of the stated purposes of the Airline Reservation and
Reporting Committee is to arrange for periodic slot exchange meetings among
its members. See THE ARLINE SCHEDULING COMMIT=EE, supra note 1, at 50-51.
14 See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint 1 8, 11, ValuJet Airlines (No. 95-CV-2896)
(carriers lease their excess slots to avoid forfeiture under the minimum use're-
quirements); 1989 FAA High Density Rule Study, supra note 107, Comments of
America West, at 27 (short term leases are frequently used to avoid the loss of
slots under the use-or-lose rule).
141 See, e.g., 1994 FAA Request for Comments, supra note 2, Comments of Mid-
west Express, at 26 (large slotholders meet minimum use requirements by having
their commuter affiliates operate air carrier slots with small aircraft rather than
transferring the slots to third parties); Id., Comments of Port Authority of New
York & NewJersey, at 4 (to maintain ownership of slots which may be withdrawn
under the use-or-lose rule, airlines arrange for the use of commuter aircraft in air
carrier slots); Surreply Comments of Air Wisconsin, Inc., In re American Airlines,
Inc. at 2-3 (Jan. 28, 1991) (according to January 1991 reservation center records,
American has parked 21 air carrier slots with its subsidiary Simmons Airlines, to
avoid forfeiture of the slots under the use-or-lose rules); 1989 GAO Testimony,
supra note 128, at 14 (slots are frequently transferred to affiliates or code-sharing
partners to prevent use by competitors). In fact, sales between related carriers
increased from 14% in 1986 to 39% in 1988. On the other hand, sales between
unrelated carriers have decreased from 110 per quarter in 1986 to 28 per quarter
in 1987 to 12 per quarter in 1988. See Airline Competition - Pending Legislation
Helps to Address Serious Competitive Problems: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on
Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1991) (statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Director of Transportation Issues,
U.S. General Accounting Office).
142 See, e.g., 48 Fed. Reg. 13,434 (1983) (proposed Mar. 31, 1983) (comments
sought by FAA on possible removal of restrictions imposed by high density rule at
ORD, LGA, JFK, and EWR); Department of Transportation Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-457, § 349, 102 Stat. 2125, 2156 (1988) (FAA directed to initiate
a rulemaking to evaluate the need for changes to the slot regulations); 53 Fed.
Reg. 51,628 (1988) (proposed Dec. 22, 1988) (comments requested on high den-
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In fact, it is the adverse effect of the apparent exercise of power
by the large carriers that repeatedly raises the possibility that the
government may take some action that reduces the value of
slots. Although the elimination of the rule is frequently advo-
cated,14 3 it does not appear likely to occur in the near future.
Increases in the number of operations at high density airports,
however, are not only more likely, but they have already oc-
curred. In this fashion, some of the concerns raised by the
smaller carriers regarding access to high density airports can be
addressed without a massive disruption to the structure and rela-
tionships which have been built over the last ten years in reli-
ance on the buy-sell rule.
Nevertheless, because slot value is created by the limitations
on access to high density airports, the elimination of the high
density rule, substantial changes to the rule, or alternative meth-
ods of access to high density airports will have an effect on the
value of slots. Although there have been objections to the artifi-
cial limitations imposed by the high density rule since incep-
tion, only in the last few years has the emphasis resulted in
modifications that alleviate some of the constraints.
sity rule as a result of Congressional mandate in Public Law 100-457); 1990 DOT
Competition Study, supra note 100 (study initiated by Transportation Secretary
Skinner to evaluate competition and barriers to entry in domestic airline industry
including examination of the high density rule); Change, Challenge and Competi-
tion: A Report to the President and Congress, NAT'L COMM'N TO ENSURE A STRONG
COMPETITIVE AIRLINE INDUS. (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter Airline Commission Report]
(FAA should review high density rule and either eliminate restrictions or increase
permitted operations); Growing to Meet Competition: The Clinton Administration's Ini-
tiative to Promote a Strong Competitive Aviation Industry, at 8 (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter
Clinton Initiative] (high density rule should be reviewed to determine whether it
can be eliminated or modified to increase airport capacity); Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569
(1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 41714 (West 1995) (hereinafter 1994 Act]
(high density rule should be examined and Congress advised of the findings).
143 Se4 e.g., 1994 FAA Request for Comments, supra note 2, Comments of Re-
gional Airline Association, at 1 (FAA should pursue increased airport capacity
rather than the artificial limitations imposed by the high density rule). Id., Com-
ments of National Business Aircraft Association, at 1 (the high density rule
should be abolished); Id., Comments of Midway Airlines, at 1 (the high density
rule should be repealed in its entirety); Id., Comments of Midwest Express at 1
(the high density rule should be abolished).
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VI. EFFORTS TO EXPAND OPERATIONS AT HIGH
DENSITY AIRPORTS
A. CALLS FOR REFORM
In August 1993 following the conclusion of extensive hear-
ings, the Airline Commission 144 recommended that the FAA "re-
view the rule that limits operations at 'high density' airports with
the aim of either removing these artificial limits or raising them
to the highest practicable level consistent with safety require-
ments."1 45 The Airline Commission's findings, however, would
not affect the legislated limits at DCA since those limits are legis-
lated by statute. 146 In response to the Airline Commission Re-
144 The Airline Commission was created on April 7, 1993, by Public Law 103-13
and was directed to investigate, study, and make policy recommendations about
the financial health and future competitiveness of the U.S. airline and aerospace
industries. National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Indus-
try, Pub. L. No. 103-13, 107 Stat. 43 (1993). The Airline Commission consisted of
fifteen voting members and eleven non-voting members, who were appointed
based on experience in aviation economics, finance, international trade, or re-
lated disciplines and represented airlines, passengers, shippers, airline employ-
ees, aircraft manufacturers, general aviation, and the financial community.
Airline Commission Report, supra note 142, at 33-34; see also Pub. L. No. 103-13,
§ 204(e) (2), 107 Stat. 43, 43 (1993).
145 Airline Commission Report, supra note 142, at 9.
146 49 U.S.C. §§ 2454(c) (5) (C), 2458(e) (1988). As has been noted:
Washington National is the only [high density] airport for which
the total number of slots today is the same as when the slot rule was
imposed more than a quarter century ago. Since deregulation in
1978, growth in the airport's annual number of departures and en-
planements has been negative .... Legislation enacted in 1986,
which transferred management of the airport from FAA to the
Washington Metropolitan Airports Authority (MWAA) prohibits
any change in the 37 hburly slots presently allowed for air carrier
operations [Metropolitan Washington Airport Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-
591)]. Thus, unlike the other HDR airports, any change in the slot
limitation on air carriers at DCA would require a change in federal
law.
1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 97. In addition to limiting the
number of slots, the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986 repealed the
restriction set forth in 14 C.F.R. § 93.124 which limited the annual number of
passengers permitted at DCA. 49 U.S.C. § 2458(e). The repeal of this provision
enabled the airlines to use larger aircraft without facing a reduction in the
number of slots. See supra note 33; 1994 FAA Request for Comments, supra note
2, Comments of MWAA, at 12-15. Notwithstanding the statutory limit on opera-
tions, the FAA permitted the published slot limits at DCA to be exceeded by four
operations per day when it granted an exemption to enable Braniff Airlines, Inc.
to resume the operations at DCA, even though all air carrier slots were already
allocated. In re Braniff Airlines, Inc., FAA Exemption No. 2927 (Feb. 24, 1984).
When the exemption was renewed following the enactment of the buy-sell rule,
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port, the Administration recommended that the DOT review
the high density rule, the process for allocating domestic and
international slots, and alternative traffic management tech-
niques, such as peak-hour pricing. 147
Congress, in the 1994 Act, also directed the Secretary of
Transportation to conduct a study of the, high density rule and
report the results of the study to Congress. 48 In conducting the
study, the DOT was directed to consider, among other things,,
the following: (1) whether improvements in technology and in
the air traffic control system and the use of quieter aircraft
would make it possible to eliminate the limitations on hourly
operations or to increase the number of such operations; 149 (2)
the effects of an elimination of the high density rule or an in-
crease in the number of operations permitted thereunder on
congestion, noise, competition, profitability, and safety;'50 (3)
the impact on EAS,151 on the ability of new entrants to obtain
reasonable timed slots, 152 and on the ability of foreign air carri-
ers to obtain slots, including issues relating to reciprocity by a
foreign carrier's home country; 153 and (4) the impact of the
withdrawal of slots to support foreign air transportation. 54
the FAA noted that it had included the slots in the current base for DCA. See
Letter from Donald D. Engen, Administrator, to Scott Keeshin, Braniff, Inc.
(Mar. 31, 1986) (on file with SMU Law Review Association). When Braniff later
discontinued all operations at DCA, the FAA granted an exemption to America
West for four DCA slots to enable it to continue serving DCA after the Eastern
slots, temporarily allocated to it were withdrawn. See In re America West Airlines,
Inc., Partial Grant of Exemption, FAA Exemption No. 5133 (Jan. 12, 1990).
Although the MWAA asserted that the slots granted to America West violated the
limitations in the statute, the FAA defended the excess slots based on the fact that
they merely replaced the slots covered by the Braniff exemption which pre-dated
the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act. Id. at 2. As such, it was the FAA's
position that the slots granted by the exemption were consistent with the statute.
Id.
147 The Clinton Administration echoed the sentiments of the Airline Commis-
sion and called for a review "to determine whether certain operating limitations
imposed by the [HDR] can be eliminated or modified to better utilize airport
capacity." See Clinton Initiative, supra note 142, at 8.
14 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 41714(e) (West 1995). Although the results of the study
were to be reported to Congress by January 31, 1995, the report was not issued
until May 1995.
149 Id. § 41714(e) (1) (A).
151 Id. § 41714(e)(1)(B).
151 Id. § 41714(e)(1)(C).
152 Id. § 41714(e)(1) (D).
153 Id. § 41714(e) (1) (E), (F).
154 Id. § 41714(e) (1) (G). To minimize the withdrawal of slots from U.S. carri-
ers for the international service of other U.S. carriers which have a large number
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B. INCREASING ACCESS AT HIGH DENSITY AIRPORTS
In an effort to increase access at high density airports, in the
1994 Act, Congress also authorized the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to grant exemptions from the slot rules. 155 Authority to
grant exemptions was limited to requests by carriers requiring
such slots to provide EAS, 156 U.S. or foreign airlines to provide
foreign air transportation, 157 and new entrant carriers. 5 8 Specif-
of slots, the FAA restricted the withdrawal of slots for international service to
preclude such a withdrawal for a carrier holding or operating 100 or more per-
manent slots. See 14 C.F.R. § 93.21 7 (a) (10) (1995). Instead, these carriers are
expected to use their existing slot base for new international service. See 55 Fed.
Reg. 53,238, 53,239, 53,242 (1990).
155 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 41714(c) (West 1995). The original House version of the
1994 Act, H.R. REP. No. 2739, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) contained provisions
that required only a study of the high density rule and prohibited the withdrawal
of slots from U.S. carriers for foreign air carriers whose countries did not provide
equivalent rights of access. See H.R. REP. No. 103-240, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 31
(1993). The Senate, in its amendment, added provisions authorizing the use of
exemption authority to create additional slots at high density airport (other than
DCA) for EAS, foreign air transportation, and new entrants. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
103-677, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1994). The House and Senate conferees
ultimately agreed upon the exemption provisions which appear in the 1994 Act.
Id. at 52.
156 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 41714(a) (West 1995). The Secretary of Transportation is
required to ensure that a carrier providing or selected to provide basic EAS has
the slots necessary. to provide flights to the high density airport at reasonable
times with consideration of connecting flights. Id. § 41714(a) (1). If necessary,
the Secretary is authorized to grant exemptions to carriers providing such service
using Stage 3 aircraft unless an exemption would significantly increase opera-
tional delays. Id. § 41714(a) (2). If an exemption would significantly increase
operational delays, the 1994 Act requires the Secretary to take such action as may
be necessary to ensure that the carrier providing or selected to provide basic EAS
is able to obtain access to the high density airport. Id. § 41714(a) (3). Notwith-
standing that direction, the 1994 Act does not require that slots be made avail-
able at ORD if there are at least 132 slots being used at ORD for basic EAS. Id.
157 Id. § 41714(b) (West 1995). The 1994 Act authorizes the Secretary of
Transportation to grant exemptions from subparts K and S of part 93 of title 14
of the Code of Federal Regulations to enable U.S. and foreign carriers using
Stage 3 aircraft to provide foreign air transportation to and from high density
airports, if such an exemption would be in the public interest. Id. § 41714(b)(1).
The Secretary is prohibited from withdrawing a slot from a U.S. carrier to award
to a foreign carrier if the Secretary determines that U.S. carriers are not provided
equivalent rights of access to airports in the foreign carrier's home country. Id.
§ 41714(b)(3). The Secretary is also prohibited from withdrawing a slot from an
air carrier to allocate that slot to a carrier to provide foreign air transportation if
the withdrawal would cause the number of slots withdrawn from that carrier at
ORD to exceed the total number of slots withdrawn from that carrier as of Octo-
ber 31, 1993. Id. § 41714(b) (2). It is interesting to note that in March 1993 the
FAA denied United's request for an exemption that would have granted the re-
lief provided by the 1994 Act. In denying the requested relief, the FAA reasoned
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ically, the 1994 Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to
grant exemptions from subparts K and S of part 93 of title 14 of
the Code of Federal Regulations to enable carriers to provide
EAS or foreign air transportation if the exemption is in the pub-
lic interest.159 In the case of exemptions for new entrant carri-
ers to provide service at high density airports (other than
DCA),16 ° the Secretary is required not only to find that the ex-
emption is in the public interest, but also that the circumstances are
exceptionaL1 6
1
Following the enactment of the 1994 Act on August 23, 1994,
the DOT received exemption applications from new entrant car-
riers,162 carriers wishing to provide EAS,163 and carriers wishing
that many of the slots withdrawn or to be withdrawn from United were acquired
by United with full knowledge of the vulnerable withdrawal priorities. The FAA
believed that granting the requested relief would give United's vulnerable slots
greater protection than the rule contemplated and would unfairly penalize other
carriers whose slots may instead be withdrawn even though they paid more for
slots with less vulnerability than United's. See In re United Airlines, Inc., Denial of
Exemption, FAA Docket No. 27151 (Mar. 30, 1993) (denial of exemption).
158 49 U.S.C.A. § 41714(c). A "new entrant air carrier" is defined by the 1994
Act as an air carrier that does not hold a slot at the airport concerned and has
never sold or given up a slot at that airport after December 16, 1985, and a "lim-
ited incumbent" is defined by 14 C.F.R. § 93.213(a) (5) (1995) (defining a "lim-
ited incumbent").
159 49 U.S.C.A. § 41714(a), (b).
- Notwithstanding the stringent limitations applicable to DCA, the 1994 Act
specifically contemplates the excess slots granted to America West at DCA and
provides that the 1994 Act will not adversely affect the exemption. Id.
§ 41714(d) (2).
161 Id. § 41714(d)(1). At DCA, the Secretary may grant an exemption only
under exceptional circumstances to a carrier currently operating or holding a
slot at the airport to enable that carrier to provide service with Stage 3 aircraft as
long as the exemption does not increase the number of daily slots at the airport,
does not increase the number of operations in any one hour period by more
than two, does not result in the withdrawal or reduction in the number of slots
held by a carrier, and does not result in a net noise increase to surrounding
communities. Id.
162 See, e.g., Application of Midwest Express Airlines, Inc. (Aug. 23, 1994) (ex-
emption requested to operate two of its slots at DCA at an earlier hour); Applica-
tion of Reno Air, Inc. (Aug. 26, 1994) (exemption to operate three daily nonstop
round trips between Reno, Nevada and ORD); Application of Western Pacific
Airlines, Inc. (Mar. 23, 1995) (exemption requested to operate two daily nonstop
roundtrip flights between Colorado Springs, Colorado and ORD); Application of
Spirit Airlines, Inc. (May 23, 1995) (exemption requested to operate five daily
nonstop roundtrip flights between Detroit City Airport and LGA); Application of
Air South Airlines; Inc. (Apr. 5, 1996) (exemption requested for roundtrip flights
between JFK and Charleston, Columbia, and Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.
163 See, e.g., Great Lakes Aviation, (Sept. 1, 1994) (requesting exemption for 24
operations to provide EAS between ORD and Danville, Galesburg, and Mattoon/
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to engage in foreign air transportation. 164 In September 1994
the DOT granted an exemption to Reno Air under the new en-
trant carrier provisions of the 1994 Act to operate three round
trip flights between Reno, Nevada, and ORD using Stage 3 air-
craft.'65 In granting the exemption, the DOT determined that
such a grant of temporary operating authority at ORD would be
in the public interest based on the economic characteristics of
the market, the history of nonstop service in the market, and the
long-expressed desire of Reno Air to serve the market. The
DOT also determined that Reno's application was unique and
met the exceptional cii-cumstances requirement of the 1994
Act.166 The exemption specifically identified the arrival and de-
parture windows for the temporary operating authority,'67 lim-
ited the use of this authority by Reno Air to the nonstop Reno-
Chicago market, and required that the service be provided only
with Stage 3 aircraft.'68 The DOT emphasized in the order that
Reno Air was being granted temporary authority only and that
such a grant did "not confer to the carrier any ability to own or
hold such temporary operating authority for the purpose of sell-
ing, trading, transferring, or conveying this temporary operating
authority (arrival or departure), or anything else of value. ' ' 69
Although Reno Air cannot transfer the temporary authority, it is
subject to the use-or-lose rule applicable to holders of slots at
high density airports.'7 0
Charleston, Illinois and Bloomington, Muncie/New Castle/Anderson, and Terre
Haute, Indiana and requesting authority to move 17 EAS slots to improve the
timing of flights between ORD and Pellston, Michigan; Quincy, Illinois; Rhine-
lander, Wisconsin; Mason City, Iowa; and Ottumwa, Iowa); Application of Direct
Air, Inc. (Sept. 6, 1994) (requesting exemption to provide EAS between ORD
and Bloomington and Terre Haute, Indiana).
164 See Petition of Simmons Airlines, Inc. d/b/a, American Eagle, DOT Docket
OST-95-368 (Aug. 2, 1995) (requesting exemption for six international slots to
operate three daily roundtrip flights between ORD and London, Ontario); Appli-
cation of El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. (March 21, 1996) (exemption requested for
two weekly roundtrip flights between Tel Aviv and Chicago); Petition of Kuwait
Airways Corporation (Feb. 22, 1996) (exemption requested for four weekly slots
between Chicago and Kuwait.
165 In re Reno Air, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 94-9-30 (Sept. 20, 1994).
166 Id. at 5.
167 The arrival and departure windows were determined by the DOT after con-
sultation with the FAA to "ensure the management and minimization of aircraft
delays while still providing Reno Air with temporary operating authority at Chi-
cago O'Hare." Id.
168 Id. at 3-4.
169 Id. at 4.
170 Id. at 6; see also 14 C.F.R. § 93.227 (1995).
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The DOT also granted an exemption to Midwest Express
under the new entrant provisions to enable it to operate two of
its slots at DCA at an earlier hour to improve the viability of its
service to Omaha. 171 In granting the exemption, the DOT de-
termined that Midwest Express's circumstances met the excep-
tional circumstances's criterion of the 1994 Act and that
granting the exemption would not violate any of the provisions
of the 1994 Act. 172 In an apparent effort to send a message that
exemptions would not be routinely granted, the DOT noted
that Congressional intent indicates that "the Secretary's author-
ity to grant exemptions under this provision would apply only in
limited circumstances to meet the specific needs of carriers
holding a limited number of slots at Washington National." 73
In denying Spirit's application, the DOT stated that it in-
tended to narrowly construe the meaning of "exceptional cir-
cumstances" for purposes of determining whether a new entrant
should receive an exemption from the slot rules. 174 The DOT's
decision to interpret the intent of Congress narrowly stemmed
from the inclusion of the "exceptional circumstances" criterion
in the provision relating to the grant of exemptions to new en-
trants, whereas exemptions for EAS and foreign air transporta-
tion were to be based on the more inclusive public interest
standard. 75 Part of its determination that exceptional circum-
stances did not exist stemmed from the DOT's belief that the
benefits of Spirit's proposal were too speculative and the opera-
tion too risky.' 76 Although Spirit proposed to use Stage 3 air-
171 In re Midwest Express Airlines, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 94-9-49 (Sept. 30,
1994).
172 Id. at 2.
173 Id.
174 In re Spirit Airlines, Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 95-8-38, at 5 (Aug. 24, 1995).
United suggested that the availability of slots in the after market as was contem-
plated by the buy-sell rule should be a threshold issue for new entrants. -Because
the 1994 Act was silent on this issue, the DOT took no position on United's asser-
tion and instead indicated a preference to rely upon individual circumstances as
set forth in a carrier's application. Id. at 7-8.
175 Id. Although the DOT noted that Congress did not specifically mandate
that exceptional circumstances only be found where there is no nonstop service
in the market, the DOT believed it was clear that the absence of nonstop service
was considered by Congress when the provision was adopted. Id. at 5. The DOT
also denied the application of Western Pacific Airlines for an exemption to pro-
vide service between Colorado Springs and ORD based in part on the fact that
adequate service already existed in the market. In re Western Pacific Airlines,
Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 95-4-33, at 3 (Apr. 20, 1995).
176 See Spirit Airlines Inc., D.O.T. Order No. 95-8-38, at 6 (Aug. 24, 1995).
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craft as required by section 206(c) (1) of the 1994 Act, the DOT
nevertheless determined that public interest requires it to con-
sider the noise concerns expressed by local communities. 177
While the DOT identified the areas where it believed Spirit
had failed to meet the exceptional circumstances criterion, per-
haps the most weight was placed on the position of the FAA Of-
fice of Air Traffic System Management (ATM) which did not
support Spirit's request. ATM's position was based on several
factors. First, LGA currently operates at capacity under almost
all circumstances due to limitations resulting from the intersect-
ing runways. 178 Second, due to limited taxiways and staging and
holding areas, ground congestion is also a problem. 179 Third,
because there are numerous air carrier and general aviation air-
ports in the New York area, the airspace in the area is congested
and complex. 180 Fourth, the delays at LGA are consistently
among the highest in the nation, and increased operations at
LGA would have an adverse impact on airports with flights oper-
ating to and from LGA.' 81
In addition to the limited relief which has been granted
under the new entrant provision of the 1994 Act, the DOT has
granted exemptions for the provision of EAS. 182 The inclu-
sion in the 1994 Act of exemption authority for EAS reflects
ongoing concern with the decline in service to smaller com-
munities, particularly those linked to ORD. These communities
continually face the possibility that their service may be dis-
continued, not only because of the impact of budget con-
straints on the EAS program, but because of the desire of
airlines to maximize the profit that they can earn with their
ORD slots. In part, because of this concern, the FAA has re-
tained the distinction between air carrier and commuter slots183
177 Id. at 8.
178 Id. at 8-9.
179 Id. at 96
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See Essential Air Service, D.O.T. Order No. 94-10-47 (Oct. 31, 1994) (grant-
ing exemption to Great Lakes Aviation).
183 See 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,192 (commuter slots should continue to be used
with smaller aircraft more suitable to small and medium sized communities and
not with large aircraft serving busier more populous markets); 54 Fed. Reg.
34,904, 34,905 (1989) (slightly increasing size of aircraft operated in commuter
slots has no significant effect on regional airline industry and service to small
communities since the distinction between these aircraft and turbojet aircraft
used for longer routes and higher volume markets remains); 56 Fed. Reg. 41,200,
41,202 (1991) (category of commuter slots is retained for aircraft of a size suita-
I
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in spite of repeated requests that the distinction be elimin-
ated. 84
In granting an exemption for twenty-four operations at ORD
to Great Lakes, the DOT stated that the "primary focus of the
slots provisions of the [1994 Act] is to restore essential air ser-
vice to Chicago's O'Hare Airport for communities that have re-
cently lost it."1 85 The DOT advised that the 24 exemptions must
be used within -the five minute increments established by the
order; must be used for the communities at issue; and must be
EAS tagged.18 6 If Great Lakes seeks to discontinue such service,
the exemption authority would be withdrawn and transferred to
the replacement carrier.18 7 As required by the 1994 Act, the
DOT stated that it did not appear that the grant of such author-
ity would result in significant delays within the meaning of the
statute, but that it would continue to monitor the operations. 88
When the DOT issued a second exemption for four opera-
tions to Great Lakes for the provision of EAS between ORD and
Oshkosh, Wisconsin, 189 the DOT noted that the combined
number of exemptions granted to Great Lakes returned the
number of EAS operations at ORD to 132-the level previously
ble only for service to smaller communities); 58 Fed. Reg. 39,610, 39,613-14
(1993) (retention of commuter slot category and limitation on size of aircraft
operated in commuter slots is intended to maintain their operation over short
and medium-haul routes in order to preserve service to smaller markets).
184 See 1989 FAA High Density Rule Study, supra note 107, Comments of Ameri-
can, at 13 (the distinction between air carrier and commuter slots should be elim-
inated); 1994 FAA Request for Comments, supra note 2, Comments of Midwest
Express, at 22 (the distinction between air carrier and commuter slots should be
eliminated). Id., Comments of Regional Airline Ass'n, at 1. Contra 1989 FAA
High Density Rule Study, supra note 107, Joint Comments of USAir and Pied-
mont Aviation, at 4 (elimination of distinction between commuter and air carrier
slots will threaten service to small communities); Id., Comments of United, at 10-
11 (separate slot pools ensure that service to smaller communities would not be
economically infeasible due to high slot prices); Id. Comments of America West,
at 35 (a single slot pool would be a "death knell" for small community service).
18 Essential Air Service, D.O.T. Order No. 94-10-47, at 2. Although the DOT
stated that it was required to grant such exemptions to air carriers using Stage 3
aircraft or to commuter air carriers, it acknowledged that if such exemptions
would cause operational delays, it would be required to assure access to ORD by
some other means. Id. Although Great Lakes also requested authority to move
the times associated with 17 of its slots, the DOT denied that request based on its
belief that the "well-timed" requirement in the 1994 Act relates to the restoration
of EAS and not all existing EAS flights. Id. at 2-3.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 2-3.
188 Id. at 4.
189 See Essential Air Service, D.O.T. Order No. 94-11-12 (Nov. 17, 1994).
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operated at ORD prior to the EAS reductions. 190 Because 132
operations were specifically identified in the 1994 Act, the DOT
advised that it was now "unprepared to authorize any additional
EAS operations at O'Hare since significantly increased opera-
tional delays could result."19 1 Consistent with its position in the
Reno Air order, the DOT also noted that the "exemptions
granted to Great Lakes ... are for the specific purpose of pro-
viding EAS at the six named communities. As such, they may
not be bought, sold, traded or leased without [DOT] approval,
and they are subject to the use-or-lose provision, and all other
provisions of the slot rules."19 2
In the area of foreign air transportation, the DOT has granted
an exemption to Kuwait Airways Corporation. 193 The applica-
tion for exemptions filed by American Eagle on August 2, 1995,
and by El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. on March 21, 1996, have not yet
been decided.'94 Of the three applications for an exemption for
slots to support foreign air transportation, only the petition filed
by American Eagle generated objections. 95 Specifically, United
raised concerns that if American Eagle, as a subsidiary of Ameri-
can, receives an exemption for slots to support its proposed
three roundtrips per day between ORD and London, Ontario, a
precedent would be established permitting the large incumbent
carriers at ORD (that is, United and American) to obtain such
exemption authority for international operations rather than re-
lying upon their own slot holdings. Perhaps because of the is-
sues raised by United's objection, it has been easier to delay a
decision on the application.
In addition to high density airport access made available to
U.S. carriers under the 1994 Act, the United States, as part of
the Air Transport Agreement entered into with Canada in Feb-
ruary 1995, included provisions to enable Canadian carriers to
190 Id. at 2.
191 Id.
192 Essential Air Service, D.O.T. Order No. 94-10-47, at 4; see also Essential Air
Service, D.O.T. Order No. 94-11-12, at 3.
193 See Kuwait Airways, D.O.T. Order No. 96-3-40 (Mar. 18, 1996) (exemption
granted for slots to support two weekly flights between Chicago and Kuwait).
194 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
195 Answer of United Airlines, Inc. dated Aug. 17, 1995, DOT Docket OST-95-
368. United pointed out American has 890 slots at ORD of which 281 are com-




obtain access to high density airports. 196 The slots allocated to
the Canadian carriers would be subject to the general rules gov-
erning slot use, 19 7 but would not be subject to withdrawal for
international service or to provide slots to new entrants. 198
Although the regulations do not contemplate the transfer of
slots used for international service except for one-for-one
trades,'9 9 the 1995 U.S.-Canada Bilateral provides that Canadian
carriers "may monetize slot holdings and... may freely buy, sell
and trade slots. '200 Any such slot transaction, however, would
permanently modify the base level and neither the airline nor
the Canadian Government would have a claim to any other slot
to restore the base level.20 1
C. WHAT DOES THE FuTURE HOLD?
In May 1995 the DOT in its report to Congress published the
results of its review of the high density rule.20 2 In its report, the
DOT made several observations regarding the potential impact
196 See Air Transport Agreement, Feb. 24, 1995, U.S.-Can., Hein's No. KAV
4196, Temp. State Dep't No. 95-73 [hereinafter 1995 U.S.-Canada Bilateral]. An-
nex II of the 1995 U.S.-Canada Bilateral provides for the U.S. Government to
establish a base level of 42 free slots for Canada at LGA and a base level of 36 free
slots in the winter and 32 free slots in the summer at ORD. Annex II further
provides that the U.S. "will endeavor to provide such slots at times of the day
suitable for transborder air service." Id. Annex H, § 1, para. 2. Slots required by
Canadian carriers in excess of the base would be obtained through normal chan-
nels. Based on the then-current slot holdings of Canadian carriers, a total of 10
new slots would be provided at ORD and 14 at LGA. Transportation Facts, U.S.-
Canada Open Skies Bilateral Aviation Agreement, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., Feb. 24,
1995, at 3, available inWESTLAW, 1995 WL 76841. Under these provisions, Cana-
dian Airlines International received six slots at ORD and ten slots at LGA while
Air Canada received four slots at each airport. See Canadian Gets Bulk of U.S. Slots;
Air Canada Gets Hong Kong, AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 13, 1995, at 395.
197 Annex V of the 1995 U.S.-Canada Bilateral exempts the slots from the use-
or-lose rule during a three year transition period. 1995 U.S.-Canada Bilateral,
supra note 196, Annex V, § 5, para. 2.
198 Id. Annex II, § 1, para. 3.
99 14 C.F.R. § 93.217(a) (2) (1995).
200 1995 U.S.-Canada Bilateral, supra note 196, Annex II, § 1, para. 5. Annex V,
however, provides that during a three year transition period, Canadian airlines
may lease or sell such slots only to other Canadian airlines. Id. Annex V, § 5,
para. 1. The slots can be traded during that period with any U.S. or Canadian
carrier for slots at other times at LGA or ORD to adjust flight times for trans-
border service. Id.
201 Id. Annex II, § 1, para. 5.
202 See 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25. This study was imple-
mented pursuant to a Congressional mandate in the 1994 Act. See 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 41714(e) (West 1995). The results of the study are based, in part, on the com-
ments filed in the 1994 FAA Request for Comments, supra note 2.
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of eliminating the high density rule and evaluated certain alter-
natives.2 ' As a general matter, the DOT noted that changing
the high density rule will not affect air safety since the rule plays
a secondary role to the FAA's traffic management system which
limits demand to operationally safe levels.20 4
After examining the capacity at each of the high density air-
ports, the DOT concluded that certain airports could accommo-
date growth while others could not.20 5 . Specifically, it
determined that ORD could support more growth since ORD
appears to have more airfield capacity, gate and landside capac-
ity, and capacity for federal inspection services.20 6 With respect
to DCA, it noted that the airfield capacity appeared significantly
higher than reflected by the number of existing slots and that
gate and landside capacity could accommodate new growth.20 7
203 The DOT explained that the 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS presents a
"snapshot estimate" of what is likely to occur if the high density rule were lifted or
modified overnight. It was noted that numerous long term and short term ac-
tions could be taken by affected parties if travel delays increased due to changes
in the high density rule, including the elimination of certain operations by the
airlines, the re-scheduling or cancellation of flights in bad weather, an alteration
of traffic management techniques by air traffic control in an effort to improve
operating efficiency, and the investment in additional capacity by the airports.
1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 7. As the DOT appropriately
noted, consumers, airlines, and the airports will be forced to adjust their behav-
ior in response to market forces, as happens at non-high density airports. Id. at 4.
204 Id. at 3, 7, 37.
205 Id. at 10-13.
206 Id. at 10. The DOT believes it is unlikely that carriers other than United
and American are likely to expand at ORD, except to their own hubs, due to the
substantial competition already provided'by United and American. As a result,
the DOT believes the total amount of the additional service would be relatively
modest and would be similar to the levels introduced by non-hubbing carriers
from points where slot controls do not exist. More significant levels of increased
operations at ORD would result from changes made by United and American.
These increases would result from these carriers' attempts to fill in existing pat-
terns of jet service and replenish commuter operations which are now operated
through their code-sharing partners due'to the change in the high density rule
which permits the operation of smaller jet aircraft in commuter slots. Id. at 54.
207 Id. at 12. Unlike the other high density airports, a change in slots for air
carriers at DCA would require a change in federal law since the Washington Met-
ropolitan Airports Act of 1986 (49 U.S.C. §§ 2454, 2458) prohibits any changes to
the 37 slots per hour presently allowed for air carrier operations at DCA. DCA
currently has 60 hourly slots, of which 37 are allocated to air carriers, 11 to com-
muters, and 12 to other users. DCA also has two additional commuter slots for
aircraft equipped to conduct a short takeoff or landing (STOL). Id. at 97. The
latest master plan for DCA, formulated in 1989 after the airport was transferred
to MWAA, assumes that the current level of slots allocated to air carriers and
commuters will remain fixed for the indefinite future. According to the DOT,
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AtJFK, the DOT noted that airfield capacity appears to be well-
matched with the number of slots while other capacities could
accommodate additional growth in operations .2 0  The existing
number of slots at LGA, however, appeared to slightly exceed
the airfield capacity, although gate and landside capacity ap-
peared sufficient to accommodate new growth. 20 9
The DOT also noted in its report to Congress that the elimi-
nation of, or a substantial change in, the high density rule is
likely to result in an increase in the number of airport opera-
tions-an increase which will be accompanied by both benefits
and costs. 2 10 Such an increase would also have implications for
air traffic management, international air service relations,1
EAS,2 12 new entrant airlines,213 loss of slot value by incumbent
carriers,' 21 and local/regional economic development. For ex-
any proposal to eliminate the rule at DCA may be perceived as counterproductive
to MWAA's planning. Id. at 105-06.
208 Id. at 11.
209 Id. at 11. Presently there are 68 slots per hour even though airfield capacity
accommodates only 66 per hour. Id. at 11.
210 Id. at 3, 15.
211 Although the high density rule and the DOT practice allow for considera-
tion of reciprocity when evaluating foreign carrier requests for slots, the high
density rule has not been used to deny access to foreign carriers. The DOT
pointed out, however, that granting slots to foreign carriers has imposed limits
on domestic service, and because these limitations may impair feeder traffic, the
unavailability of slots at specifically desired times may have restrained interna-
tional services. According to the DOT, an elimination of the high density rule
could result in new international service by U.S. and foreign carriers. See id. at
16. The DOT noted that because the 1994 Act authorizes the Secretary of Trans-
portation to grant exemptions for air carriers to provide foreign air transporta-
tion, the need to increase slot withdrawals from domestic carriers in the future
would not exist even if the high density rule is retained. See id.
212 Although the DOT notes in its report to Congress that the high density
rule, particularly at ORD, may have served as a barrier to EAS, the exemption
authority contained in the 1994 Act provides an alternative avenue for carriers to
provide EAS. See supra text accompanying notes 182-92.
213 The DOT recognized that the high density rule has served as a barrier to
service by new entrants at high density airports because these carriers have been
unable to assemble a sufficient number of slots during desirable time periods to
begin service. This inability stems in part from the unwillingness of the incum-
bents to sell slots due to an apparent concern about the competitive conse-
quences of new entrant activity. See 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note
25, at 16.
214 The report to Congress recognized that because slots provide access to a
limited resource, the slots provide a value to the holders which have the opportu-
nity to earn financial returns. Specifically, the DOT identified the following four
measures of slot value: (1) the economic value of a slot; (2) the sales value of a
slot; (3) the value of a slot as collateral for securing a loan; and (4) the account-
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ample, consumers would benefit from new and expanded air
services and the reductions in air fares that would result from
increased competition.215 Airports would benefit from increases
in revenue which result from the larger number of opera-
tions. 16 The incumbent carriers, however, would face a reduc-
tion in profits when the fare premium presently charged at
certain high density airports is lost due to increased
competition. 17
The DOT believed, however, that due to the increased opera-
tions that would result from the elimination of the high density
rule, consumers and airlines would not only experience an in-
crease in airport operations, but they would also experience an
increase in travel delay time and costs. 218 The benefits of such
an elimination varied from airport to airport. At ORD, there
would be a positive net dollar benefit of $205,000,000 per
year.2 19 At JFK, the value of the additional service resulting
from an elimination of the high density rule would slightly out-
weigh the cost of delay and would result in a net benefit of $7
million per year. 22 0 At LGA and DCA, however, the elimination
of the high density rule would result in net losses.22'
ing or balance sheet value of a slot. As the DOT noted, the first three measures
reflect the potential earning power of a slot for generating positive economic
returns while the last (the balance sheet value) depends upon accounting prac-
tices. Id. at 17; see also supra text accompanying notes 101-13.
215 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 3, 8.
216 Id.
217 Id. The DOT noted that there does not appear to be a fare premium at
JFK
218 Id. at 11-13. Although the DOT found no technical barriers to air traffic
control's ability to ensure safety while managing increased operations without a
high density rule, it indicated that delays would be likely not only at the high
density airports but also at other airports. For example, a significant increase in
delays atJFK or LGA could affect delays at EWR and other nearby airports due to
the "interaction of airspace" in the area. Id. at 15. Notwithstanding this concern,
the DOT noted that after a period of adjustment, the delays should be no greater
than at other major airports that operate without the high density rule, such as
Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport, Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport,
and Los Angeles International Airport. Id.
219 The net benefit is based on consumer benefits of $1.3 billion in the form of
fare reductions and new services, reduced by $645 million to reflect the costs
resulting from delays, resulting in a net consumer benefit of $626 million. The
airport would gain $25 million in revenue from the increased operations. The
airlines, however, would experience a loss of $446 million resulting from the loss
of the fare premium and the cost of delayed flights. Id. at 10.
220 Id. at 11.
221 The DOT determined that the overall net financial impact at LGA would be
negative with an overall loss of $17 million per year. Id. At DCA, the DOT be-
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Because the elimination of the high density rule would likely
cause a change in the type of operations and aircraft used, the
processing of traffic by the airports would also be affected due
to the different separation standards for heavy and largejets and
prop aircraft.222 The DOT also believed that because the en-
forced leveling of operations imposed by the high density rule
would no longer govern, airlines could reschedule their flights
to more desirable times of the day, causing operations to be
more concentrated or peaked during certain time periods.2 23
An elimination of the rule would also cause a near-term increase
in the size of the population affected by aircraft noise at each of
the high density airports, 4 although the noise would be re-
duced as carriers make the transition to a Stage 3 fleet.225
In addition to the operational and consumer issues, the elimi-
nation of the high density rule would have a direct effect on the
value that has been derived from slots. Although an incumbent
airline would still have its operations at the high density airport,
the fare premium would likely be diminished as a result of in-
creased competition. This reduction in fares would cause a loss
of the slot's economic value.226 Sales value would be completely
eliminated since slots would no longer be required. Since slots
would have no value and, in fact, would not exist, the ability to
use slots as collateral would also be eliminated depriving carriers
of this financial resource and creating potential problems for
parties that have accepted slots as collateral.22 7 If the high den-
sity rule is eliminated, carriers that reflect slots on their balance
lieves there would be a sizeable negative net benefit in terms of dollars. Based on
the DOT's analysis, the costs would be significantly greater than benefits due to
(1) large increases in operations and delays, and (2) a large increase in general
aviation traffic which contributes to delays, but only benefits a limited portion of
the airport users. Id. at 13.
222 Id. at 39.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 3. The DOT also noted that the concentration of more operations
into shorter periods of time as occurs with increased peaking not only exacer-
bates delays, but it also increases perceived noise. Id. at 44.
225 Part 91, subpart l of the FARs mandates the gradual elimination of Stage 2
aircraft and a transition to a Stage 3 fleet in the contiguous United States com-
mencing January 1, 1995, and prohibits the operation of Stage 2 aircraft in the
contiguous United States after December 31, 1999. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.853,
91.865, 91.867 (1995).
226 See 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 17; see also supra text
accompanying notes 101-13.
227 See 1994 FAA Request for Comments, supra note 2, Comments of the City of
Chicago, at 17 (a phase-out of the high density rule would permit a more orderly
write-off of slots including those used as collateral).
1996] 925
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
sheet would need to write them off to the extent they have not
already been depreciated.2 28
In addition to examining the impact of an immediate elimina-
tion of the high density rule, the DOT also evaluated various
alternatives. First, the DOT considered' a phase out of the high
density rule over a specified period, such as five years, in order
to stretch out the realization of the benefits and costs associated
with immediate elimination of a rule.229 The considered phase
out could be implemented by gradually reducing slot controlled
hours at the airport or by gradually increasing the number of
slots until demand (or available capacity) is met.23 0 Another al-
ternative considered by the DOT was the retention of the high
density rule with the addition of slots either to the point of allo-
cating all available capacity or specifically for the provision of
high value services which the DOT defined as long haul, large
jet operations.23 1 The DOT also considered an alternative that
would not involve lifting the rule entirely or adding more slots.
Under this alternative, the high density rule could be eliminated
during the periods at each airport when operations are slack,
thereby allowing market forces to determine the types of serv-
ices offered at these times. 2
If the high density rule is to be retained, the DOT suggested
several changes that could be made to either improve the per-
formance of the rule or simplify its implementation, or both.233
First, the DOT suggests that the definition of a slot be changed
to take into account separation standards for different aircraft
228 See 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 17. It should be
noted that in its comments on the NPRM which proposed the buy-sell rule, the
FTC noted that "[f]inancing [of slots] should be facilitated by the fact that slots
are non-depreciating and readily transferable." 50 Fed. Reg. 52,180, 52,185 (cit-
ing FTC comments).
229 The DOT believes it is unlikely that fare reductions will occur unless the
high density rule is eliminated or a very large number of slots are added. See 1995
DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 18.
230 &
231 Id. Under such an alternative, slots would be added to bring operations up
to the airport's balanced airfield capacity at ORD and DCA. At LGA and JFK,
where capacity is already constrained, a "reasonable" number of slots would be
added to accommodate high priority users including international operations.
The DOT does not believe this alternative would provide any significant changes
in the peaking pattern of operations or any reductions in fares. Id. at 40.
232 Id at 20. The DOT noted that there is a considerable drop-off in opera-
tions from Saturday noon through Sunday noon at ORD, LGA, and DCA.
Although there is no weekend drop-off in operations at JFK, there is a seasonal
reduction in operations during the winter.
233 Id. at 110-11, 122.
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and the amount of time needed to process an aircraft through
the system.2 3 4 The DOT also suggests that the slots be enforced
on a rolling hour basis which would eliminate situations where
two back to back half hours exceed the hourly slot limit.23 5 This
rolling hour concept would be coupled with a change in the slot
definition as noted above.236 Another alternative suggested by
the DOT would be the assignment of limited terms for slots in
order to maximize benefits at the high density airports consis-
tent with public interest concerns. Under this scenario, each
domestic slot would be defined as having a finite life after which
it would be withdrawn and redistributed among users to ensure
that some slots become available on a regular basis.237 The DOT
also suggested that slot pools could be reallocated among user
groups to improve the net benefits generated at the airports. It
is clear that the DOT believes net benefits rise with large aircraft
and long distance flights as well as intercontinental flights to cit-
ies not presently served. It also believes that domestic flights us-
ing large jet aircraft produce greater benefits than commuter or
general aviation flights with smaller prop aircraft. 38
Modifications to the use-or-lose rules were also suggested.239
Under the present rule, some carriers may operate marginal or
unprofitable flights during the weekends merely to maintain
their slot allocation. The DOT believes that incentive may be
eliminated if there is no enforcement of the use-or-lose rule on
weekends, thereby resulting in the availability of more weekend
slots to be leased out to other potentially higher value users. 40
Such an analysis reflects the DOT's apparent perspective regard-
234 Id. at 110. Currently, slots are defined as the right to land or take off dur-
ing a specific time period; the allocations are made without reference to the fact
that different aircraft require different amounts of time to be processed through
the system.
235 At certain airports abroad, such as London Heathrow, the total number of
slots permitted in any hourly period (regardless of when it starts and ends) can-
not exceed a set limit. This rolling hour provision would eliminate the occur-
rences at the high density airports, especially ORD, where back to back half hours
exceed the hourly slot limit. Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 111. The DOT suggested that separate pools of slots could be main-
tained for different user groups. The reallocation could be accomplished
through an auction process.
238 Id.
239 At present, a carrier must use slots 80% of the time over a two-month pe-
riod (average of 5.6 operations per week to maintain daily slot allocation). 14
C.F.R. § 93.227(a) (1995).
24 See 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 111.
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ing the shortcomings of the high density rule. Rather than at-
tempt to force carriers to release the slots for the weekends, the
DOT accepts the status quo and attempts to resolve it by relieving
the carriers of some of the burdens imposed by the use-or-lose
rule-burdens intended to shake out slots that were not being
used.
With respect to the distinction between air carrier and com-
muter slots, the DOT suggests that the distinction may cause cer-
tain high value opportunities to be missed. As such, the DOT
believes the distinction should be eliminated.24 1 If a distinction
remains, the DOT suggests that commuter use of air carrier slots
be prohibited, thereby encouraging the holder of air carrier
slots to sell or lease their slots to other operators when they do
not have an appropriate use for them. 42
Certain minor administrative changes to the high density rule
were also urged by the DOT. First, the DOT believes that the
concept of "substantial compliance" 243 should be formalized at
JFK and LGA to raise quotas to actual levels. 44 It also suggests
that trades on international slots within a carrier's base alloca-
tion be permitted so that a carrier can trade domestic and inter-
national slots within its own base to improve the timing of
flights.245
Based on the information compiled in the course of the 1994
FAA Request for Comments as reflected in the 1995 DOT RE-
241 Id. To address public interest/distributional questions, a separate pool of
EAS slots could be maintained. To date, the repeated requests to eliminate the
distinction between air carrier and commuter slots have been unsuccessful. See
supra note 183.
242 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 111. As the DOT notes,
many carriers currently operate commuter size aircraft in air carrier slots. Id. In
certain circumstances, this enables the carrier to maintain the slot and keep out
potential competitors operating higher value jets. See also discussion supra note
141.
243 The FAA's "substantial compliance" policy provides a degree of flexibility at
high density airports when exact literal compliance has not been accomplished.
This policy was implemented prior to the enactment of the buy-sell rule enabling
operators to meet the operational quotas over several hours, rather than the 30
or 60 minute time frames set forth in the rule, as long as a balance of operations
was maintained. See 1994 FAA Request for Comments, supra note 2, Comments
of the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, at 5 .




PORT TO CONGRESS, the DOT announced that it was not in the
public interest to change the high density rule at present.246
VII. CONCLUSION
As noted earlier, when originally adopted, the high density
rule was intended to be a temporary measure.247 Obviously, it
has been far from temporary. Although the FAA has at times
increased the level of operations permitted during controlled
hours, it has also increased the number of controlled hours at
certain airports. It would appear, at least from the perspective
of the DOT and the FAA, that the high density rule is here to
stay. Given the congestion and delays experienced at airports
not subject to the high density rule, one has to wonder how the
DOT and the FAA justify the retention of the high density rule
at certain airports when it has not been imposed at others.2 48
The high density airports are certainly no more or less con-
gested than other major airports such as Los Angeles, Atlanta,
Miami, and Dallas.
The 1995 DOT REPORT TO CONGRESS reflects that air traffic
capabilities can accommodate increased capacity and that the
number of slots can effectively be increased at ORD, LGA, and
JFK through the exemption process authorized by the 1994 Act.
It appears, however, that at least for the time being, these lim-
246 DOT Issues Report on High Density Rule, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. NEws, June 16,
1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 361737 ("Based on the report, the depart-
ment concludes that the projected costs to consumers, airlines and communities
of eliminating or modifying the rule currently outweigh the benefits, and that it
would not be in the public interest to initiate a rulemaking on this issue.").
247 See supra text accompanying notes 1-16.
248 Although the DOT has noted the possibility that due to congestion and
delays at certain airports, the 'creation of an allocation program or market for
slots may be required in the future, no action has been taken to increase the
number of high density airports. See 1990 DOT. Competition Study, supra note
100, at 2-20 to 2-25. Instead, when significant delays at Atlanta, Boston, ORD,
Dallas, Denver, Newark, and Philadelphia raised concerns, the DOT granted the
airlines discussion authority and antitrust immunity to facilitate the shifting. of
schedules necessary to alleviate the delays. See Discussion Authority, D.O.T. Or-
der No. 87-3-39 (Mar. 11, 1987). The DOT chose to address the congestion prob-
lem through carrier discussions even though the FTC suggested that the problem
be solved by expanding the high density rule to cover the additional airports
facing delays. Id. at 2-3, 8; see also Discussion Authority, D.O.T. Order No. 87-1-54
(Jan. 28, 1987) (show cause order). Such restrictions are imposed by the DOT
when particular airports will face unusually high operations for a limited period
of time. See 61 Fed. Reg. 5492 (Feb. 12, 1996) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91,
SFAR 74) (temporary slot requirements imposed at Atlanta airports during the
1996 Summer Olympic games).
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ited increases in operations are the only way to accommodate
new entrants and alleviate the anticompetitive impact of the
high density rule. Recognizing, however, that there have been
technological advances in air traffic control since the high den-
sity rule was adopted over twenty-five years ago and that the slot
restrictions at high density airports are an impediment to new
entry and growth and therefore competition, efforts will con-
tinue to be made to eliminate or significantly relax slot
restrictions.
Although the scarcity value would be somewhat diminished by
an increase in the number of slots, financial disruption would
be minimized. It is clear that despite the belief that the buy-sell
rule would enable market mechanisms to facilitate access to
high density airports, no meaningful access has been provided
to new entrants since the buy-sell rule was enacted. The only
meaningful access ever granted to a new entrant at a high den-
sity airport was that provided to New York Air in 1980, which
occurred only because there-was no buy-sell rule and the FAA
intervened.
Aside from the noise-related issues which have been so closely
tied to slot restrictions, it appears that the buy-sell rule has virtu-
ally ensured that slots at high density airports will not be elimi-
nated in their entirety. Although there may be concern about
the anticompetitive nature of the rule and its discrimination
against new entrants, it is recognized that the sudden elimina-
tion of slots would have a negative financial impact.
The sensitive issues for the future are not whether the basic
rules will be eliminated, since repeal of a rule by the FAA is a
rarity. Rather, the primary issue is whether the FAA will con-
tinue to find or be forced to find additional capacity in the sys-
tem to increase the number of slots at the high density
airports-something that has already been done through the
1994 Act. Based on the technological advances in the area of
navigation, there will also likely be an increase in permitted op-
erations at high density airports with the possible exception of
DCA. Thereafter, the issue will reduce itself to the method by
which the additional capacity will be allocated. It is a sure bet
that new entrants will argue for priority; certain incumbents will
want the slots previously withdrawn from them to support restor-
ing other operations; international carriers will want their piece
of the pie; smaller communities will want slots for EAS (to the
extent the program survives); and some communities will fight
the increase because of noise concerns. Regardless of the
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method of allocation, it is unlikely that significant changes will
be made at high density airports.
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